Sowing the seeds of civil war: Regime destabilization and the adoption of neoliberal economic policies in Syria by Guffey, Kelli A.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Theses and Dissertations 1. Thesis and Dissertation Collection, all items
2017-06
Sowing the seeds of civil war: Regime
destabilization and the adoption of neoliberal
economic policies in Syria
Guffey, Kelli A.
Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/55608
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United
States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the
United States.














Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
SOWING THE SEEDS OF CIVIL WAR: REGIME 
DESTABILIZATION AND THE ADOPTION OF 








Thesis Advisor:  Anshu Chatterjee 
Co-Advisor: Robert Looney 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB  
No. 0704–0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing 
instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection 
of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including 
suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 
Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork 
Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY 
(Leave blank) 
2. REPORT DATE   
June 2017 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE   
SOWING THE SEEDS OF CIVIL WAR: REGIME DESTABILIZATION AND 
THE ADOPTION OF NEOLIBERAL ECONOMIC POLICIES IN SYRIA 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
 
6. AUTHOR(S) Kelli A. Guffey 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING 
ORGANIZATION REPORT 
NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND 
ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING / 
MONITORING AGENCY 
REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the 
official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB number ____N/A____. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
Syria’s devolution into civil war over the last five years has left that country devastated. The 
conditions there raise several questions about the causes of pronounced socioeconomic stratification 
between the political elite and the average citizen, which steadily worsened after President Bashar al-Assad 
came to power in 2000 and eventually resulted in a civil war. This thesis asserts that the Assad regime’s 
implementation of a wide range of liberal economic reforms, under the guidance of the IMF, ultimately 
contributed to instability in three main ways. First, these reforms disproportionately harmed the 
agricultural sector that employed the majority of Syrians. Second, these reforms cut social services in the 
overcrowded cities that were stretched thin by the influx of Iraqi refugees after the U.S. invasion in 2003, 
which also saw an increased migration from the agricultural areas when a severe drought hit the agriculture 
areas in 2006. Third, these reforms produced discordance in the power structure by changing the 
beneficiaries from the old Ba’athist guard to new Alawite crony-capitalists, which resulted in seething 
resentments. This research shows that the new elite competition along with the authoritarian nature of the 
regime prevented an appropriate response to the crisis eventually leading to violence.  
 
 
14. SUBJECT TERMS  
Syria, IMF, economy, economic policies, neoliberal economics, drought, Bashar al-Assad 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
97 

















NSN 7540–01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2–89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239–18 
 ii 




Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
 
 
SOWING THE SEEDS OF CIVIL WAR: REGIME DESTABILIZATION AND 
THE ADOPTION OF NEOLIBERAL ECONOMIC POLICIES IN SYRIA 
 
 
Kelli A. Guffey 
Lieutenant, United States Navy 
B.A., The University of Oklahoma, 2011 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 
MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES  






















Chair, Department of National Security Affairs 
 iv 




Syria’s devolution into civil war over the last five years has left that country 
devastated. The conditions there raise several questions about the causes of pronounced 
socioeconomic stratification between the political elite and the average citizen, which 
steadily worsened after President Bashar al-Assad came to power in 2000 and eventually 
resulted in a civil war. This thesis asserts that the Assad regime’s implementation of a 
wide range of liberal economic reforms, under the guidance of the IMF, ultimately 
contributed to instability in three main ways. First, these reforms disproportionately 
harmed the agricultural sector that employed the majority of Syrians. Second, these 
reforms cut social services in the overcrowded cities that were stretched thin by the influx 
of Iraqi refugees after the U.S. invasion in 2003, which also saw an increased migration 
from the agricultural areas when a severe drought hit the agriculture areas in 2006. Third, 
these reforms produced discordance in the power structure by changing the beneficiaries 
from the old Ba’athist guard to new Alawite crony-capitalists, which resulted in seething 
resentments. This research shows that the new elite competition along with the 
authoritarian nature of the regime prevented an appropriate response to the crisis, 
eventually leading to violence.  
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I. SOWING THE SEEDS OF CIVIL WAR: THE ADOPTION OF 
NEOLIBERAL ECONOMIC POLICIES IN SYRIA 
Syria’s devolution into civil war over the last five years has left the country 
devastated. The conditions there raise several questions about the causes of pronounced 
socioeconomic stratification between the political elite and the average citizen, which 
steadily worsened after President Bashar al-Assad came to power in 2000 and eventually 
resulted in a civil war. Current casualty estimates from the United Nations claim over 
400,000 people had been killed, and well over five million Syrians have registered as 
refugees since the start of the conflict. The humanitarian tragedy is on a scope that has 
not been seen since the Second World War. Syria has been set back decades in terms of 
development and is now functioning as a war economy that exists on both financial and 
material support from other nations. The Syrian Arab Republic’s condition raises several 
questions of what led to this war and devastation. The main objective of this thesis is to 
examine the economic variables that may have influenced the conflict and de-stabilized 
the county.  
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Several scholars point to a pronounced socioeconomic stratification between the 
Syrian political elite and the average citizen prior to the civil war, which had steadily 
worsened since President Bashar al-Assad came to power in 2000. Interestingly, the 
Assad regime implemented a wide-range of economic reforms toward a more liberal 
market economy under the guidance of the IMF. This thesis examines the sectors of the 
Syrian economy that felt the changes brought about by these strategies, which had come 
to full fruition by the start of the civil war in 2011. This thesis studies both the 
macroeconomic effects of economic liberalization as well as the microeconomic effects 
of the Assad regime’s economic policies on different sectors in Syria to understand the 
impact of these reforms and how they were de-stabilizing to the state. How were the main 
sectors of the economy—agriculture, oil/manufacturing, business—in Syria shaped by 
the opening of the economy to the global market? How did the adoption of new economic 
policies affect Syrians dependent on each of these sectors for their livelihood?    
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This thesis holistically investigates the Assad regime’s adoption of neoliberal 
economic policies, under the auspices of the IMF, and whether these policies contributed 
to instability in Syria. 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
So, reform in politics is important but it is not as important and urgent as 
the people waking every day and they want to eat, to have good health, to 
send their children to good schools. That is what they want. I want to feel 
safe in my own country. That is my goal. 
—Syrian President, Bashar al-Assad1 
 
The Syrian Civil War remains a bloody stalemate between the Assad regime’s 
government forces, various opposition groups, and international actors such as Russia, 
the United States, and the Turkish Republic. The conflict’s impact cannot be overstated, 
as fighting continues to spill over into already precarious bordering states in the Middle 
East, and into the more economically-challenged states of the European Union. This 
movement of refugees in 2015 alone constitutes one of the largest movements of 
displaced persons and refugees since WWII with over a million Syrian refugees 
registered in neighboring Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, and Egypt.2 As a result of this mass 
refugee movement spilling over from neighboring Arab states into other states on the 
Mediterranean, the schism between the Greek government and officials from other states 
within the European Union has been exacerbated. While the impact of the more than 
5 million registered Syrian refugees through the course of this conflict has been even 
more devastating to the neighboring Arab countries, the tension the situation has caused 
in Europe has had very real political consequences. The UNHCR reported figure of over 
5 million refugees includes 2.1 million Syrians registered in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, and 
Lebanon, 2.7 million Syrians registered by the Government of Turkey, as well as more 
                                                 
1 Bashar al-Assad, Personal Interview, Wall Street Journal, January 31, 2011. 
2 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 3RP Regional Refuge &e Resilience Plan 2016-
2017: IN Response to the Syria Crisis, Last accessed May 30, 2016, 
http://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/3RP-Regional-Overview-2016-2017.pdf, 6. 
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than 29,000 Syrian refugees registered in North Africa.3 It is in this vein that the regional 
and international instability that has ensued due to the Syrian civil war warrants both 
academics and policy makers to explain what led Syria, under the Assad regime, down 
the path to a failed state.  
This thesis explores how Syria, on a path of economic and social reform, 
devolved into chaos and civil war on a scale that has further de-stabilized the Middle East 
and threatens to do the same in the European states on the Mediterranean. The intent is to 
the limited research on globalization and international finance in Syria under Bashar al-
Assad. This thesis sought to understand the correlation between globalization/ neoliberal 
economic policies, and the largely state-controlled economies of the Middle East, and to 
add to the limited research on the topic. By analyzing Syria, provided an in-depth case 
study of the socio-economic challenges of globalization on the state, and how specific 
neoliberal economic policies destabilized the state. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
The purpose of this thesis is to answer the question of why, despite marked 
growth of Syria’s GDP after the implementation of neoliberal economic policies, adopted 
under the auspices of the IMF, the country went from reforms to revolt to civil war. It is 
not logical to determine potential frameworks for a post-war Syrian economy if the 
economic performance and policies adopted prior to the outbreak of the war are not 
accurately analyzed. This thesis addresses that subject through determining which 
factors—both internal and external to the Assad government—were the most responsible 
for the precariousness of the economic schism in Syria prior to the outbreak of civil war 
in 2011. Based on the literature examined, several potential hypotheses emerged to help 
explain how the adoption of new economic policies produced or affected the civil war:  
                                                 
3 Syria Regional Refugee Response Inter-agency Information Sharing Portal, United Nations High 




H1: The flow of international finance has increased both economic inequality 
and poverty through a decline in the state’s provision of social welfare.4  
HI assumed that as Syria transitioned from a state-run economy to a participant on 
the global market, the government rolled back on social programs that were previously 
the purview of the state. It was this lack of provision with respect to social services that 
greatly influenced the people to rise up.   
H2: The flow of international finance only benefited a small, elite circle 
within Syria that is strongly linked to the Assad regime. This further exacerbated 
sectarian tensions in the country. 
H2 assumed that because the economic growth in Syria only benefited a small 
subset of the population, the perceived injustice was de-stabilizing and contributed 
toward violent, sectarian conflict.  
Due to exacerbation of socioeconomic and sectarian divisions within Syria, both 
of these hypotheses have important implication for future transitions from statist to 
market economies.  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This thesis evaluates how the implementation of neoliberal economic reforms in 
Syria destabilized the state. The thesis develops hypotheses to explain the deficit between 
the relative economic growth achieved at a macro level after these reforms were enacted 
and the adverse effect of these reforms on Syrians at the local level. The outcome of this 
research helps explain how the economic success of transitioning to a market economy 
created a setting, which, combined with drought and other such crises, led to increased 
protest and civil war during the same decade. The purpose of this literature review is to 
provide the theoretical framework for this research and to analyze the literature available 
that details historical policies and approaches of Syria’s economic reforms under 
President Bashar al-Assad. This literature will begin by examining the theoretical 
framework of ideas associated with Syria’s economic reforms. In particular, economic 
liberalization, globalization, the welfare state concept, and causes of civil wars will 
                                                 
4 Hamed El-Said and Jane Harrigan, “Globalization, International Finance, and Political Islam in the 
Arab World,” The Middle East Journal, 60, no. 3 (2006): 444. 
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be surveyed. The literature review will then delve into the specific case study of Syria 
to show how these theoretical concepts apply to the Middle East, and, more specifically, 
to Syria.  
1. Economic Liberalization 
In order to understand the effects of economic liberalization on Syria, it is first 
imperative to understand what is meant by economic liberalization, and further what is 
the motivation for adopting neoliberal economic principles. Joseph Stiglitz, Nobel-prize 
winner in economics, defines economic liberalization as, “the removal of government 
interference in financial markets, capital markets, and of barriers to trade.”5 Economic 
liberalization in this vein encompasses both capital and financial markets within a state. 
While Stiglitz argues the reasons that liberalization enjoyed so much widespread support 
in advanced industrial countries are still salient and warrant further academic research. 
Stiglitz provides several push factors that provide compelling reasons why developing 
countries choose to open their state economies to the outside world through liberalization: 
1. according to Stiglitz, the “IMF insists on [a fast] pace of liberalization for assistance—
and countries facing any sort of crisis feel they have to [acquiesce] to the Fund’s 
demands”;6 2. “Capital market liberalization,” Stiglitz argues, “strips away the 
regulations intended to control money in and out of the country”;7 3. free markets are 
thought to be more efficient, and will therefore allow for faster growth;8 and 
4. liberalization will enhance stability by diversifying the sources of funding.9 These push 
factors provide a way to understand why the Assad regime, and other similar 
states, adopted economic liberalization policies when it did during the Damascus Spring 
in 2001. More importantly, Stiglitz argues that economic liberalization does not 
acknowledge that the economic developments that accompany liberalization will also 
require a transformation of society. This need for economic development to accompany 
                                                 
5 Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents (New York, W.W. Norton Company, 2003), 59.    
6 Ibid., 62. 
7 Ibid., 65. 
8 Ibid., 67. 
9 Ibid. 
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liberalization policies is not an integral part of the Washington Consensus approach nor is 
it a core tenet of the IMF. This is important to understanding the Assad regime’s struggle 
to institute both economic and social reforms. Stiglitz argues that the case for instituting 
economic liberalization is compelling; however, the transition period is not always fully 
realized by the states instituting policies and relatively ignored by those advanced 
countries and international organizations pushing for liberalization. Syria may have 
experienced this, which the research will try to explore.  
Amartya Sen, another Nobel-prize recipient, argues for the more idealistic nature 
of economic liberalization by espousing that the case for the freedom of market 
transactions is intrinsically tied to the basic importance of freedom itself, another 
important reason why states took on economic liberalization.10 Sen argues that, “to deny 
that freedom would be in itself a major failing of a society.”11 For Sen, economic 
liberalization is the preferred mechanism to place individual freedom at the center of the 
global economy. Freedom is seen as both the means and the ends of economic 
liberalization, which is believed to provide the most effective means of sustaining 
economic life, or rather, “development.”12 By intrinsically linking freedom and as a 
means of economic development which is gained through economic liberalization Sen 
makes a moral case for pressing states to reform. While Sen does not specifically discuss 
the idea of development as freedom in the Middle East, he does discuss overcoming 
economic deprivations in other parts of the developing world through liberalization. 
In the case of Syria, the adoption of liberalization became part of these larger trends 
across the world as it was offered as a solution to problems of development facing 
many countries.  
2. Globalization 
Closely linked with economic liberalization is globalization. An analysis of what 
is meant by globalization, what effects it has on weak or developing states, and what sort 
                                                 
10 Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (New York, Anchor Books, 1999), 112.   
11 Ibid.  
12 Ibid., 36. 
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of systems need to be in place with in a state for it to function on a global market is 
critical to understanding whether the Assad regime’s adoption of neoliberal economic 
policies, under the auspices of the IMF, contributed to instability within Syria. 
Chen and Hule understand globalization as a “process of increasing international 
economic activities.”13 They further define globalization as an increase in the 
liberalization of international trade for good and services as well as the movement of 
international capital, while cross border movement is still strictly prohibited. The 
theoretical model they constructed helps to understand the present world economy as well 
allocation effects on globalization. Chen and Hule argue that globalization with free trade 
will overall improve global welfare. However, their modeling approach does not address 
social, political, and cultural aspects to globalization.14 Particular discussions on the 
applicability of their modeling to rentier state economies are also missing.  
Arguing that globalization is generally a misunderstood concept, Jha offers a new 
way of understanding the concept by combining economic and political theory that shows 
the consequences of rapid industrialization. In opposition to the vast amount of available 
literature, Jha attributes globalization not to the revolution in transport and information 
technology but rather to the barriers put in place during the era of the nation state to the 
free movement of labor.15 More importantly, Jha, a leading economist in the developing 
world, examines the role of the nation state in globalization, and how the actions of the 
United States, as the only super power, has eroded the Westphalian system.16  Jha argues 
that the United States uses coercive methods, often referred to as “compellence” and that 
this has been detrimental to trade unions, the welfare state, the nation state, and the 
Westphalian international order, all of which make up the political and economic 
institution that are the bedrock of civilized life.17 Understanding the global economy over 
                                                 
13 John-ren Chen ed. Economic Effects of Globalization (Brookfield, VT: Ashgate Publishing 
Company, 1998), 2. 
14 Ibid., 26.  
15 Prem Shankar Jha, The Twilight of the Nation State: Globalisation, Chaos and War (London, Pluto 
Press, 2015), 82. 
16 Ibid., 190. 
17 Ibid., 325. 
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the last several decades and the effect of globalization on developing countries provides 
the context for decisions made by specific regimes. While Jha does not specifically 
discuss Syria, other Middle Eastern states, namely Iraq, are discussed; whose instability 
and economic troubles had a lasting effect on the region. In addition, he presents another 
way of understanding economic liberalization relevant to this research because it shows 
the different effects that supranational organizations such as the IMF have had on 
domestic economic reforms in states. 
Meanwhile Sassen suggests that the state continues to play a fundamentally 
important role, despite globalization. Furthermore, Sassen argues that states, more so than 
domestic firms or international organizations, will assume an even more important role in 
developing their state’s political economy.18 If this assertion is valid, than we can posit 
that there are necessary conditions that may be set for engagement by nation states in the 
process of globalization. To this point, individual nation states can control and are 
responsible for setting the structural, monetary, and fiscal policies needed before opening 
up their economies to the global market. Sassen discusses concepts such as deregulation 
arguing that states may determine their own destinies by their ability to work through the 
process of setting new regulations, legislative items, court decisions, etc., that facilitate 
economic growth.19 For Sassen, in the era of economic liberalization and globalization, 
the state remains the guarantor of rights of that state’s global capital. It is the nature of 
cooperation needed in the global economy that predisposes states to this. Sassen’s 
complex theories on the convergence of national regulations and laws, global markets, 
and instituting private authority into state normativity are fundamentally important for 
developing states instituting economic reforms. While there is a plethora of research 
enumerating the outside pressures of globalization, there is a lack of research that deals 
with the effects of globalization internal to developing nations.  
                                                 
18 Saskia Sassen, “The State and Globalization,” in The Emergence of Private Authority in Global 




3. Welfare State Concept 
In his examination of the welfare state and rentier economic systems, Schwarz 
argues “that rentier states stand in contrast to states that have to rely on domestic resource 
extraction [because] they display a path to state-formation that defies the European path 
of state-formation.”20 The Syrian regime has put in place a public sector centered on its 
nationalized assets, and a peasantry supported by state cooperative, which is a rentier 
economic system. The dependence of these rentier states on natural resources (mainly oil) 
weakens the power of the state because government does not have to acquiesce to societal 
needs and demands because it does not rely on taxation as a source of revenue.  Schwarz 
further argues that because state-formation in a majority of rentier states did not occur in 
conjunction with  “political accountability [and] transparency… the expenditure side of 
[their] public revenues is most clearly linked to a state-building agenda [which creates] 
societal peace and political acquiescence”—not necessarily re-investment for economic 
growth.21 On a theoretical level, Schwarz’s articles provide a perspective of state-
formation that is centered on the development of states in the Middle East, particularly 
Arab states. Because Schwarz focuses on a functional understanding of statehood, the 
article thereby highlights where Arab states are strong and where they are weak.22 
Schwarz sees social welfare as a moving pendulum on this weak-strong continuum 
wherein Arab rentier-economic systems provide social welfare when resources allow, and 
choose to cut social welfare programs first when there is economic crisis. This assertion 
tends to a larger discussion of what sort of social services that citizens should expect 
from a functioning state.  
Schwarz and other scholars propose that what is expected from a functioning state 
in the Arab Middle East is fundamentally different from what is expected in the West due 
to the nature of state formation in the Middle East based around the rentier economic 
                                                 
20 Rolf Schwarz, “The Political Economy of State-Formation in the Arab Middle East: Rentier States, 
Economic Reform, and Democratization,” Review of International Political Economy, 154 (2008): 601. 
21 Schwarz, “The Political Economy of State-Formation,” 599. 
22 Ibid. 
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system.23 To this point, war-making and state-formation have not happened in concert 
with one another in the Arab Middle East, which shows the rentier-effect on state 
formation in two very important ways: 1. the excess oil revenues in the hands of Arab 
states reduced the necessity to tax their own population, and 2. modern rentier states are 
able to provide welfare and a semblance of wealth to their citizens because of excess 
revenues.24 Theoretically, understanding the rentier nature of the Arab state as the 
linkage between state-formation, war making, and stability is crucial to determining 
causation of civil war in Syria. The same rentier system employed by Arab states that are 
coercive and authoritarian in nature, also allows for institutional weakness that makes 
coping with the challenges of economic reform and globalization even more problematic.  
4. Understanding Civil War 
The preponderance of literature examined on civil wars was to understand how 
economies may be driving factors toward civil war by establishing preconditions that can 
de-stabilize a regime. The World Bank project has identified a set of statistically 
significant correlates of civil war known as the “Collier-Hoeffler Model of Civil War 
Onset.”25 Collier and Hoeffler advocated an economic model for civil war that argues 
civil wars happen when they are economically feasible, or rather, that a rebellion must be 
financially viable. It is in this vein that policy makers should be able to design policies 
that counteract financial viability of rebellion. The Collier-Hoeffler model analyzes civil 
war and rebellion as they relate to both motive and opportunity; however, the model sees 
opportunity as the primary determining factor of rebellion, which makes this model a 
useful framework for an analysis of the Syrian Civil War.26 
                                                 
23 Schwarz, “The Political Economy of State-Formation,” 611. 
24 Ibid., 609.  
25 Paul Collier and Nicholas Samanis, eds., Understanding Civil War, Volume 2: Europe, Central 
Asia, and Other Regimes (Washington, DC: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The 
World Bank, 2005), XIII. 
26 Ibid., 3.  
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5. Economic Growth/Globalization in the M.E.  
To gain a better understanding of the relationship between economic growth and 
globalization in the Middle East, I will examine three main questions: 1. why was 
economic liberalization prevalent in the later part of the 1980s and into the 1990s?; 
2. how does economic liberalization and globalization apply specifically to the Middle 
East?; and 3. what is the nature of the discourse on the topic by Middle East scholars?  To 
the first point, many scholars have cited that during the 1980s many developing countries 
that faced varying degrees of economic distress turned to the IMF and World Bank for 
financial support in the form of economic aid or debt forgiveness.27 The Arab world was 
no exception to this, though the predominance of literature on economic reforms during 
this time period focuses on Latin America. The “Washington Consensus,” —and its 
prescription for immediate trade liberalization combined with large cuts in government 
spending and imposition of new taxes—had its heyday in the 1980s, and this mindset was 
pervasive.28 
To the second question, the Middle East and the 1980s and into the 1990s 
witnessed a new era in not just global order with the end of the Cold War, but also 
numerous regime changes in the MENA region. As things evolved on the political front 
in the Arab World, these new rulers, more often than not, were turning to their form of 
economic liberalization in the hopes of gaining favor and support from the IMF.29 The 
Arab states that did not start to liberalize economically were “disciplined or contained.”30 
Syria at this time was not the Bretton Woods poster child as regimes such as Tunisia or 
Morocco could be characterized. Dr. Raymond Hinnebusch, leading expert on political 
economy in the Middle East (particularly Syria), has researched how the economic crisis 
the Arab world faced in the late 1980s led to a consensus among the ruling party in Syria 
that private investment was the only solution to the exhaustion of Syria’s statist 
                                                 
27 Hamed El-Said and Jane Harrigan, “Globalization, International Finance, and Political Islam in the 
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28 Ibid. 
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economy.31 Hinnebusch argues that as the Syrian state started down the path of economic 
liberalization it saw private and foreign direct investment as a precursor to opening up 
other sectors of the Syrian economy.32  
To the final questions, the overwhelming opinion of Middle East specialists view, 
economic liberalization in the Middle East as particularly difficult because of the 
“social effects of reform, coupled with demographic trends, and the depletion of natural 
resources.”33 The depth of these social and developmental challenges not factored in to 
the mainstream calculus of globalization will be the focus of research to form clear policy 
recommendations for Arab states in an era of increased globalization. Social and 
developmental challenges unique to the Arab World will also be studied to understand 
how international organizations may better facilitate the changes inherent with 
globalization. In particular, the work of Dr. Samer Abboud will be most helpful to 
understand the differences in economic liberalization in the Middle East in comparison 
with other developing areas around the world. Abboud’s research primarily focuses on 
the political economy of the Syrian conflict, and places emphasis on “the matter of 
capital flight and its implications on Syria’s reconstruction.”34 Abboud has argued that it 
is a model of social, economic, and political organization that is in support of state-
building rather than economic development underpins statism in the Middle East, 
particularly in Syria.35 Abboud’s research will serve to provide an understanding on what 
the social market economy entailed in the Syrian context during reform, as well as how 
this version of a social market economy drove the public narrative in Syria.  
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32 Ibid., 6. 
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6. Political Climate 
Many authors lauded Bashar al-Assad’s rise to power after his father’s death and 
discussed, with more than a tone of lament, that he provided hope to Syrians and the 
international community as a whole.36  The political climate and economic reform have 
been inextricably linked since Bashar al-Assad took office in 2001. The world financial 
crisis, as argued by Marshall, finally “seem[ed] to have forced the pendulum back in the 
direction of reform” with even hardliners in the Assad  regime calling for more economic 
liberalization though patronage politics willing to be initiated by the regime in order to 
achieve liberalization-centric reforms and economic growth- which was, arguably, 
counterproductive.37  The overall argument by most literature on the political climate for 
economic reform prior to the outbreak of civil war is authoritarian in nature. The Syrian 
regime was unlikely to cede any real power or dominance in the name of economic 
reform because the regime’s survival depends on the control of the patronage system 
within the state—of which the newly “privatized” financial system in Syria is a large 
contributor.38 Gifford succinctly summed up the political climate asserting that, “Syria’s 
meager economic opening has contributed to even greater cronyism and concentration of 
resources among the regime elite.”39 
7. Syrian Civil War and Regional Literature 
The Syrian revolt turned civil war against the Ba’athist regime is different than 
the revolution seen in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, and Libya because Syria’s largest cities did 
not take the lead in inciting the insurrection.40 This concept of geography plays an 
important role in understanding not only the nature of the uprising but also a 
comprehensive look at the effects of poverty and inequality in different regions of Syria. 
Al-Khajafi’s extensive work on De-Urbanizing the Syrian Revolt provides the geographic 
                                                 
36  Shana Marshall, “Syria and the Financial Crisis: Prospects for Reform?” Middle East Policy, 16:2 
(2009):106. 
37 Ibid., 108.  
38 Ibid., 110. 
39 Lindsay Gifford, “Syria: The Change That Never Came,” Current History (2009): 421.  
40 Isam Al-Khafaji, “De-Urbanizing the Syrian Revolt.” Arab Reform Initiative (2016): 2. 
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framework through which to understand the causation and correlation of economic 
liberalization policies and their effect on different parts and socioeconomic classes of 
Syria.41  
As the tragedy of the Syrian conflict continues to deepen, information on the 
ground becomes more difficult to find, and there is a definite fear that some of the history 
of the conflict and the reformers within the country will be lost. Of the literature, 
available detailing not only the conflict, but also the modern history of the Syrian Arab 
Republic, the most comprehensive has been Raymond Hinnnebusch and Tina Zintl’s 
Syria from Reform to Revolt: Volume I. This volume discusses the division and 
uncertainty surrounding Bashar al-Assad’s rise to power in July of 2000 after his father’s 
death, and also explores how Bashar al-Assad’s domestic and foreign policy differed 
from the status quo under the Ba’ath party.42 Major Syrian policies discussed in the 
volume include: consolidation within the Ba’ath party to insulate the regime; controlling 
movements in opposition to economic reform; how the regime co-opted private charities; 
as well as the ability of Syrian cities and towns to cope with the massive influx of Iraqi 
refugees. The volume clearly details both the risks associated with these policies and the 
shortcomings inherent in their implementation.43 The book further illustrates why a 
seemingly stable Syria came to an abrupt end with the uprising in the early spring of 
2011. This volume is particularly useful for this research because it showcases the work 
of several international scholars that represent a variety of disciplinary backgrounds, 
which is key to understanding the current crisis in Syria, particularly as the crisis relates 
to economic reform.   
Other authors of note on Syria include David Lesch, whose book The Fall of the 
House of Assad details the causes of the Syrian uprising and the regime’s tactics to 
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remain in power.44 While the book is interesting because of the author’s personal contact 
with Bashar al-Assad, the social context of the revolution and a discussion of the political 
economy are missing from its analysis. As well as Nikolas Van Dam, a Syrian specialist, 
who places special emphasis in his writings and research on the assumption that, “Arab 
nationalist and class loyalties are developing in Arab society, thereby replacing 
traditional particularist loyalties and commitments.”45 This assertion is critical in the 
thesis’s representation of the overlap between sectarian, regional, tribal, and socio-
economic groups in Syria. 
8. Conclusion 
There is a gap in the research available on why economic reforms hindered the 
Assad regime’s ability to respond to the needs of its citizens during the drought. There 
also seems to be a lack of literature on the number of Iraqi refugees within Syria, and 
how this large number of refugees may have also strained the states resources. This thesis 
seeks to contribute to the myriad of academic research on Syria under Bashar al-Assad by 
showing that the neoliberal economic reforms helped create a setting and sowed seeds 
that fomented the civil war. Lastly, there is little academic research on the involvement 
on the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank between 2000 to the start 
of the Syrian civil war. This thesis hopes to help fill this gap through providing a better 
understanding of the involvement of both organizations in the political economy of Syria 
during these formidable years.  
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis uses a comparative study approach, comparing the Syrian statist 
economy under Hafez al-Assad with the market economy developed through the 
neoliberal reforms of Bashar al-Assad beginning in 2000 through to the outbreak of civil 
war 2011. After a comparative, macroeconomic analysis of the Syrian political economy 
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during these two different time periods, the thesis analyzes how Bashar al-Assad’s 
neoliberal economic policies affected different regions/ sectors in the economy in Syria to 
show the disproportionality of these reforms at a microeconomic level. Similarly, to the 
United Nations Development Center (UNDCP), I will be splitting Syria up into the 
following four geographic regions: the northeast, comprising Idlib, Aleppo, al-Riqqa, 
Deir al-Zor, and al-Hasaka; the coast region, comprising Latakia and Tartuos; the central 
region, comprising Homs and Hama; and the south, comprising Damascus, rural 
Damascus, Da’ra, Suweida, and al-Quanaitra46 to show the disproportionality of 
economic reforms on the different geographic regions. In particular, the southern and 
northeastern region are analyzed extensively due to their heavy economic dependence on 
the agricultural sector. This thesis uses the 2006–2009 drought that devastated the 
country, as well as the Da’ra uprising in 2011, as case studies to show the destabilizing 
effect of neoliberal economic reforms in the country.  
This thesis will use all available primary and secondary scholarly sources, 
including but not limited to books, articles, theses, news articles, IMF documents 
concerning Syria, and government (both U.S. and Syrian) sources.  
F. THESIS OVERVIEW  
This thesis is divided into four chapters using the comparative analysis and case 
study format. Following the introductory chapter, Chapter II first examines the Syrian 
political economy under Hafez al-Assad’s Ba’athist regime. Chapter II then analyzes how 
the Syrian political economy was affected by globalization and economic liberalization 
policies enacted upon Bashar al-Assad’s rise to power. This chapter focuses on the 
macroeconomic picture. Chapter III is a microeconomic analysis of economic reforms 
from 2000 to the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War. This chapter discusses the Syrian 
regime’s insufficient response to the most recent drought, the disproportionality of 
reforms absorbed by the agricultural sector, and how reforms led to discordance within 
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the regimes power structure. Chapter IV will be a discussion of social safety nets, media 
coverage of the fallout from reform, and also outlines implications for the future of 
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II. SYRIAN ECONOMIC REFORMS UNDER 
THE BA’ATHIST REGIME 
To better understand frameworks of development trajectories—defined as patterns 
of economic change and structural transformation—a discussion of politics is essential.47 
In the case of the Syrian Arab Republic, the rule of the House of Assad, first under Hafez 
al-Assad and currently under his son Bashar, defines the politics for the state during the 
era of economic reform. Politics, as related to the economy, means the struggle over 
resources as well as the formal and informal rules and institutions that govern who 
controls what resources, and how this control is exercised. The basic unit of analysis is 
the Syrian national economy, which—like most of the Arab states of the Middle East—
was in its infancy following the First World War.48 This chapter will examine the history 
of the political economy in Syria at a macroeconomic level, specifically focusing on two 
main components: 1. the Syrian political economy from the time of the intra-Ba’ath party 
coup in 1970 that brought Hafiz al-Assad to power until his death in June 2000; and 2. 
the series of economic reforms under the auspices of the neoliberalist policies 
spearheaded by his son, Bashar al-Assad, upon his ascension to power in Syria through 
the devolution in to Civil War.  
This macro-level assessment will, with a broad brush, show the growth of the 
national and per capita income in Syria from 2000 with Bashar al-Assad rising to power 
to the devolution into chaos in 2011, and how this relationship changed in three major 
sectors: agriculture, industry, and services. This three-sector model, first pioneered by 
economist Simon Kuznets, is the best fit for political economy studies of the region as a 
whole because this model places emphasis on agriculture and industry: two sectors that 
are mutually reinforcing in their ability to produce real growth in a given state.49  
                                                 
47 Melanie Cammet, Ishac Diwan, Alan Richards, and John Waterbury, A Political Economy of the 
Middle East, Fourth Edition (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2015), 9. 
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49 Ibid. 
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A. OVERVIEW OF POLITICAL ECONOMY DEVELOPMENT IN M.E. 
For most of the developing world, economic growth during the twentieth century 
follows a similar, prescriptive pattern. This prescription generally starts with an inward-
looking phase wherein developing states would transition to enclosed systems that 
emphasize economic policies that nurture local manufacturing, otherwise known as 
import substituting industrialization (hereafter, ISI). The goal of the ISI model was quite 
simply to help developing countries escape the agrarian trap that imperial powers had 
placed upon them by allowing for the development and promotion of infant industries.50 
To escape the agrarian trap the state apparatus pursued industrialization policies that 
would have a cumulative effect through raising incomes in the country, which would in 
turn open new markets which would therefore allow for infant industries to grow in the 
country. These infant industries would in turn produce industrialization as experienced in 
Europe without competition and allow for an increase in domestic incomes. This increase 
in income would produce the capital accumulation needed to fuel the innovation to make 
these products competitive in the global market as the economy liberalized. Turkey was 
the first among the Middle Eastern states to, rather successfully, employ the ISI strategy 
and other states in the region attempted to follow suit in the 1960s and 1970s.  
Despite international and state-led efforts, ISI floundered in the Middle East 
primarily due to the lack of protection given to the infant industries in conjunction with 
the disproportionate allocation of public resources given to them at the expense of 
agricultural sector.51 The rural populations could not generate the demand to keep these 
infant industries afloat, nor were these infant industries creating the jobs necessary to 
facilitate the worker transition from the agricultural sector in to the industrial sector. The 
high cost associated with these infant industries often combined with idle capacity and a 
monopoly over the domestic market which did not provide incentives to keep costs down 
or to operate more efficiently. The shrinking in the agricultural sector was not met with 
the needed growth in domestic industry to meaningfully employ those making the 
transition from rural areas to the cities in many of these states, Syria included. The high 
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costs of manufacturing did not allow for many of these goods to be exported. Limitation 
of exports limited foreign currency exchange and, ultimately, curtailed the foreign direct 
investment (FDI) needed to import more raw goods and better equipment. These infant 
industries would lead to both a fiscal and balance of payment deficit, resulting in a 
financial crisis for most of these states that they were unable to weather, which was only 
exacerbated by an oil recession. The piecemeal application of the ISI model had only 
shaken the already fragile economic system; it had not brought the overwhelming 
industrialization to any of the states in the region that would have allowed them to 
compete in the global market.52 
Following the oil recession that plagued the Arab states (both oil exporters and 
importers) of the Middle East for most of the 1980s, a series of economic reforms were 
implemented by several states in the region. These neoliberal economic reforms, born out 
of the Washington Consensus, emphasized a particular mode of government-economic 
relations, and considered “capitalism and democracy as a tonic” that would cure 
economic underdevelopment.53 These programs rested on the notion that market reform 
and a reduction of the state’s role in the economy would be achieved through stabilization 
and structural adjustment programs. The reforms focused on four main areas: 1. cutbacks 
in government spending; 2. privatization of state-owned enterprises; 3. reduction of 
barriers to trade; and 4. liberalization of interest and exchange rates.54 Arab regimes 
implemented different elements of reform piecemeal throughout the region. These lines 
of effort focused on cutting back government spending instead of building institutional 
capacity in the states, which was not in keeping with the legacy of neoliberal economic 
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reforms enacted in the U.S. or the rest of the developed world.55 Furthermore, these 
policies were not as austerely promoted or implemented in the U.S. or the developed 
world as they were in the recipient states in the developing world.56  For example, the 
cuts to government spending and social services would never have survived first contact 
in a democratic, capitalist state; however, this will be discussed in further detail in the 
following chapter. At a macro-level, these reforms or structural adjustment (SA) were 
meant to rebalance state budgets and eradicate external debts to restore economic growth 
in the region. SA policies came to dominate the political economy of the region, and 
particularly damaging to what the World Bank refers to as “resource rich labor abundant” 
(or RRLA countries) in the MENA region, of which Syria is considered.57  
In order for SA to be effective, trade should be liberalized, markets opened, and 
public enterprises privatized. At the outset, this proved to be challenging for the RRLA 
countries that had yet to go through true industrialization which would have entailed 
moving labor and capital from industries that were not productive to sectors that could 
compete abroad. This fact, coupled with the left over inefficient business practices 
instituted during the ISI phase, would require a lot of political capital to have a change of 
success in any RRLA country. The Syrian Arab Republic, as will be shown, had a unique 
set of challenges on the eve of implementing SA policies due to its subscription to a 
unique brand of Arab socialism under the Ba’ath party, combined with a tenuous and 
diverse mix of ethnic and religious groups in the country.  
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B. SYRIAN POLITICAL ECONOMY PRIOR TO BASHAR AL-ASSAD 
1. The Ba’athist Effect on Political Economy 
Hafiz al-Assad ruled the Syrian Arab Republic from the time of the intra-Ba’ath 
party coup in 1970 until his death in June of 2000. The sectarian, tribal, and regional 
loyalties that were factors in his rise to power in Syria have undoubtedly played a role in 
the political economy of the country, and, as such, warrant analysis. Our aim is to focus 
on how these factors shaped the political economy of the state prior to the start of SA 
reforms under Hafiz al-Assad’s son, Bashar al-Assad, and will therefore only briefly 
touch on the politics and society of the Syrian Arab Republic during the elder Assad’s 
struggle for power. There are two main factors that worked in favor of Hafiz al-Assad in 
comparison with other domestic factions in Syria that were vying for power and other 
states in the MENA region: the rise of religious minorities to positions of power, and 
Hafiz al-Assad placing primacy on expanding the country’s military strength vis-à-vis 
Israel over the socialist ideals of the Ba’ath party.58  
2. The Rise of the Alawis 
The rise of religious minorities in Syrian political life since the breakup of the 
United Arab Republic in 1961 is critical for understanding the politics because it was a 
divergence from the traditional power structure in Syria, which was overwhelmingly 
Sunni-led. A hold-over from the days of the Ottoman Empire, sectarian loyalties were 
also stressed under the French Mandate to assuage an assertion of Arab nationalism, and 
religious minorities like the Alawis and the Druze were granted a degree of autonomy to 
keep them separate from the political consciousness of the majority Sunni Muslim 
country.59 This divide and rule policy instituted under the French, as some scholars have 
argued, stifled the ability of Syria to develop a political consciousness as a nation-state.60 
Instead the pan-Arab identity of the state was emphasized or loyalty to a particular region 
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within the state, which typically had a tribal/ethnic/religious component to it. This has 
allowed for a polarization in Syrian society between Sunnis and Syria’s religious 
minorities, and is also correlated to development patterns in the state.  
For Syria’s religious minorities, the significance of one’s religious identity is that 
it ties them together as a community defined by particular political and social interests. 
Religiosity is not necessarily an important factor in the community. These different 
religious communities are not distributed evenly throughout Syria, and are instead 
concentrated in specific Syrian provinces. For example, over 75% of Alawis lived in the 
Latakia region—with most traditionally working in the agrarian sector, while the coastal 
cities and towns were overwhelmingly Sunni until the 1970s.61 Coastal cities such as 
Latakia were an outpost of the Sunni-led capital of Damascus until Hafiz al-Assad’s rose 
to power, and the Sunnis held dominion over the agricultural lands surrounding the city. 
Distrust festered between the Alawi majority population and their Sunni overlords for 
decades in the Latakia region. While this distrust between Sunni and Alawi has not been 
assuaged under either Hafiz or Bashar, the socioeconomic conditions for the Alawiite 
community have improved significantly since the Ba’athist takeover, with Latakia and 
Dar’a provinces enjoying significantly higher government-led growth and development 
projects, which will be examined in the following chapter.   
The rise of the Alawis in Syria increased minority participation in the armed 
forces and in the Ba’ath party. Ideologically, the Ba’ath Party, founded in Damascus in 
1940 by Michel Aflaq (a Greek Orthodox Christian) and Salah al-Din Bitar (a Sunni 
Muslim),62 was supposed to represent cultural unity that allowed the Syrian state identity 
to transcend above all other forms of factional solidarity. This, however, denied the social 
reality in Syria of religious/sectarian channels that relied on regional politics with specific 
goals. While the party may have been founded in Damascus, the initial party members 
were overwhelmingly from rural (minority) areas of the country that came to the  
capital for education; therefore, it was a rural party. The socialist ideals of the Ba’ath 
party were particularly attractive to rural and minority populations in Syria for two main 
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reasons: 1. minority populations in the large cities and the rural areas surrounding them 
were traditionally dominated by a Sunni-bourgeoisie class—a holdover from the Ottoman 
reliance on urban notables—and thus the socialist underpinnings of the Ba’ath Party were 
amenable to disenfranchised communities; and 2. there was a secularist character to the 
Ba’ath Party’s nationalism, which attracted the minorities. Historically, Arab nationalist 
movements (e.g., the Muslim Brotherhood) tied their brand of nationalism with Sunni 
Islam as a defining factor. The Ba’ath Party de-emphasized the role of religion, and 
espoused a united, secular Arab society with a socialist system. This “Arab socialism” 
envisions a society in which all Arabs are equal, and the state plays a crucial role in 
developing large public sectors, driving economic growth, and providing social programs 
and economic privileges to its citizens.63 Arab socialism is unique from other forms of 
socialism because it does not completely disregard the role of religion within society, but 
rather subjugates a citizen’s religious identity to that of their national identity to the 
socialist republic. 
3. Ideological Struggle to Define the Ba’athist Agenda 
The time from the establishment of a Syrian state that was free from the yoke of 
French Mandate until Hafiz al-Assad’s official ascension to the Syrian presidency in 
1970 was mired in a series of coups. The infighting within the Alawi community for 
control of the   Ba’athist party agenda defined the political economy of the Syrian state 
for the coming decades. This power struggle raged between the two most prominent 
members of the Alawi community: Hafiz al-Assad and Salah Jadid. From 1964 until al-
Assad’s ascension to the presidency, these two men of the Ba’athist Military Committee 
sought to control the party. Jadid succeed in maintaining his grasp over the Syrian 
civilian party apparatus, while al-Assad retained supremacy over the Syrian Armed 
Forces.64 Both men had divergent views of the party, and each shaped the Syrian state in 
the future, both domestically and internationally.  
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In this vein, al-Assad believed in ending Syria’s isolation in the world and sought 
rapprochement with more conservative Arab states. Assad believed that a more unified 
Arab front (one in which the Arab states put aside their differences with one another) was 
the best way to effectively fight Israel. Meanwhile, Jadid and his allies within the 
Alawiite community argued that only a more progressive, socialist Arab state would be 
able to challenge Israel due to development of socialist institutions.65 Measurable success 
in surprising the Israelis in the 1973 War solidified al-Assad’s position in the Alawiite 
community and essentially put the issue to rest. The domestic, socialist transformation 
advocated as the main priority for the Ba’ath Party by Jadid and his supporters took a 
back seat to strengthening the Arab military potential through investing even more 
heavily in the Syrian Armed Forces. While there were anti-regime propagandists who 
insinuated that the Syrian Ba’ath regime was more concerned with first being Alawi, then 
Ba’athist, and finally Syrian, the al-Assad regime had to maintain its firm hold on power 
through maintaining loyalty within the Alawi community. This maintenance of the power 
structure in the state was, first and foremost, considered by most scholars to be where any 
formidable opposition to Assad’s power would potentially come from.66  
4. Rise of the Syrian Statist Economy 
The socio-economic realities in Syria have changed drastically since Hafiz al-
Assad came to power with the November 1970 coup, and the decision to move the Syrian 
Ba’athist regime in to a more formidable military situation has had a profound impact on 
the course of economic development. If taken holistically, the change and development 
during from the early 1970s through the 1990s looks impressive. As renowned economist 
and Syria expert Volker Perthes noted in 1995, “the Syria of the 1990s produced 
fertilizers, orin bars, cables, tires, electrical engines, and a choice of medical drugs and 
consumer articles. None of these were part of the country’s productive spectrum in 
1970.”67 Perthes further goes on to argue that when the macroeconomic picture is viewed 
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not from start to finish but rather by the progress made in each individual decade, the 
1980s are a lost decade for Syria in terms of development, and that the 1990s had (up 
until his writing in 1995), seen no real transformation in the public and private sector that 
would lead to sustained economic growth.68  While the Syrian economy has undergone 
some diversification, under Hafiz al-Assad’s rule, the macro-economic indicators 
(i.e., GDP structure and distribution of employment throughout different sectors of the 
economy) show that the economy has not been able to achieve a sustainable level of 
industrialization. As shown in Table 1, the change from an agrarian to an industrial 
economy had not happened on the eve of the 21st century.  
Another component to the statist economy that Bashar al-Assad would inherit 
from his father involved the relative autonomy the regime enjoyed in economic and 
development policy-making.69 There was little direct intervention by external actors in 
the Syrian economy, putting aside the reliance on external rents and the curse of being 
dependent on the oil market. Unlike other states in the region, the Assad regime was able 
to craft and implement economic policies that would further its political goals. Hafiz al-
Assad placed a premium on national security and regime stability, and any economic 
adjustment processes undertaken by his regime were used to reinforce these goals. 
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Note: All figures on employment, omit the military, and understate the informal urban sector 
jobs. Numbers derived from Statistical Abstracts 1992, 1993; Population Census 1970, 1981. 
Table 1.   GDP Structure and Sectoral Distribution of Employment (%)70 
 
Unlike the economy, which did not see any significant structural change under 
Hafiz al-Assad, the Syrian society has changed rapidly under his rule. The 
aforementioned decline of participation in the agricultural sector has been glaring, 
especially when one considers that half of the Syrian population in 1970 was employed in 
agriculture while the numbers in the early 90s show less than 30% of the population 
employed by agriculture.71 Combined with the decline in agricultural jobs is an increased 
birth rate across the country and fewer Syrians living in the rural parts of the country. 
This may be considered a success story had the increase in urbanization been in 
conjunction with an overall growth in labor sector jobs in the cities, but this has not 
overwhelmingly been the case. Sustainable, modernizing development should have seen a 
growth in the middle class as well, but those numbers have not kept pace with the 
population growth across any of the industries, and internal migration from the rural areas 
into the cities continues to be a problem. While the Ba’ath regime has taken substantial 
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steps toward improving rural living conditions, there is still a marked difference between 
the standard of living in the countryside and in the cities.  
The last element of the statist economy to set the stage prior to the transition of 
power from Hafiz to Bashar al-Assad involves the security apparatus. The central and 
most dependable instrument of power in the Assad regime is the combination of Syria’s 
military forces, the intelligence community or mukhabarat, and the police. Since coming 
to power, Hafiz al-Asad has grown the security apparatus to an unprecedented and 
arguably impressive rate. The military, while not on equal footing to the Israeli Defense 
Forces, certainly poses a threat and has changed the political calculus in the region. In 
conjunction with an increase in troop numbers (some 80,000 in 1970 to over 430,000 in 
by the early 1990s), is an increase in the scope and agency of the Syrian Department of 
Defense.72 By the early 1990s, over 60,000 civilian government employees work in the 
department of defense and the economic sector of the department encompasses several 
industrial establishments and construction companies. As Perthes concludes in his critical 
work on the Syrian political economy under Hafiz al-Assad, “it seems that it is the 
privileged position of the security apparatus in the regime and the material privileges 
extended to its member that in general make it, more than anything else, a reliable arm of 
the regime.”73 The Syrian regime, while highly militarized, should not be mistaken for a 
military regime. Rather, the Ba’ath party under Hafiz al-Assad set up an authoritarian 
regime in which the security apparatus does enjoy a significant amount of agency in all 
things that concern the regime’s security, including its own privileged place in the 
economy. Bashar al-Asad, upon his ascension to the presidency, would learn quickly that 
the seemingly insurmountable force represented by the security apparatus was both the 
crux of his power, and his greatest opponent to vital and sustainable economic growth.   
C. SYRIA UNDER BASHAR AL-ASSAD 
Bashar al-Assad, Hafiz al-Assad’s second-oldest son, was never supposed to rule 
Syria. While Syria is officially a republic, Hafiz’s oldest son, Basil, was being groomed 
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to assume the mantle of the House of Assad and the presidency until his untimely death 
in a car accident in 1994.74 Basil was a military figure, revered within the regime, 
whereas Bashar was a Western-educated ophthalmologist living in London at the time of 
his brother’s death with no real prospects of one day ruling the country. Bashar’s 
education and manner, more so than his pedigree, is what made him so endearing to 
Syrians who, six short years later, would refer to Bashar as “The Hope”75 as he ascended 
to the presidency with little opposition or in-fighting after his father’s death in 2000. 
While the Syrian people (largely kept out of any real political participation in the 
country) and Western leaders lauded the ascension of Bashar al-Assad to the presidency 
as a harbinger of liberalization and democratic change, the Ba’athist regime seemed to 
follow suit. Like a well-oiled machine, Bashar went from being the son of Hafiz al-Assad 
with no real role in the party or the military to being promoted to Lieutenant General and 
Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces the day after his father’s death.76 Within 
weeks, he was elected Secretary General of the Ba’ath Party, and the Syrian Parliament 
also amended their constitutionally set age requirement from 40 to 34 so as to 
accommodate Bashar’s age.77 And by July 17, 2000 Bashar al-Assad was taking the 
constitutional oath of office and delivering his presidential inauguration speech in 
Damascus after receiving 97.2% of the vote in a national referendum. The Ba’athist 
regime in Syria seemed to remain intact, even without its strong man. The inaugural 
speech itself was enlightening, and certainly not in keeping with the traditionally held 
views of the Syria held by many Westerners, nor did it toe the traditional Ba’athist party 
lines. Indeed, Bashar criticized some elements of the previous regime and emphasized 
that economic reform was his main priority, and that state bureaucracy had become a 
major obstacle.78 Bashar and those he brought into the folds of his new government were 
set to the task of modernizing Syria, revamping bloated bureaucracy, and liberalizing the 
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economy. They were not, as many hoped at the time, there to reform the political 
landscape. Utopian hopes for wide-sweeping Western-style democratic reform were not 
going to be met. While the new president did speak of a “democracy specific to Syria” he 
believed that there were more pressing institutional reforms needed and that the Syrian 
people were overwhelmingly not ready for democracy yet.79 
1. Inherited Authoritarianism 
What Bashar inherited from his father in July 2000 was an authoritarian state in 
an overwhelmingly precarious situation due to corruption, sectarian violence stemming 
from a lack of political participation, and a stagnant economy. While precarious, the 
Syrian state was not different from other authoritarian regimes in the Middle East—other 
mukhabarat states—and what Bashar saw as an initial prescription for the countries ills 
was to begin to normalize its relations with the global community as a whole. The 
inherited authoritarian state had other ills that would prove to be a much tougher 
prognosis, and directly inhibit the desperately needed economic growth:  
 Small, fragmented private sector incapable of accumulating capital 
 Lack of regulatory regime  
 Judiciary tied to the regime 
 No stock market 
 Restricted banking system  
 Vibrant black market 
 Excess of small-scale enterprises in non-productive sectors 
(i.e., commerce vs. manufacturing) 
 Significant brain drain of those Syrians that leave the country for higher 
education 
 Large agricultural sector  
 Unsustainable and volatile, semi-rentier system 
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When laid out, it seems only natural that Bashar al-Assad would focus on 
economic liberalization as a way to cure the ills from the authoritarian regime he 
inherited, but this liberalization was not to be undertaken for the sake of democratization. 
Rather, these reforms were under the guise of reinforcing the resiliency of the Ba’athist 
regime he now led in what some have referred to as “recombinant authoritarianism.”80 To 
achieve this, Bashar had inherited a strong security state from his father, a point that 
should not be overlooked. Under Hafiz, the regime was able to consolidate both society 
and its own apparatus’s firmly under the government’s control.81 Regime stability—
facilitated at times by brutal oppression—had been the key to achieving marked change 
in the Syrian Republic to that point.  
2. Promises of Change  
Bashar al-Assad, unlike his father, sought to focus his efforts on domestic 
challenges, and his reformist agenda reflected a need to revamp domestic policy and 
structures. Of his policy changes, some, such as removing the ban on importing satellite 
receivers, were viewed as moving toward political openness and colored as a nod toward 
democratization.82 Similarly, the first year of his presidency allowed for an opening in 
the press that had not existed in Syria since the Ba’athist takeover, during which Syrian 
intellectuals used this opportunity to plea for further political freedoms, removal of 
martial law, and release of political prisoners. This period, known as the “Damascus 
Spring” saw a precipitous growth of civil society organizations and protest that caught 
the newly-minted president and some of the more junior members of the regime off 
guard.83 While the literature on the opening and subsequent reversal of some of the 
political and social reforms allowed during the Damascus Spring are significant from a 
social movement standpoint, a full analysis of this time is beyond the scope of this work. 
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Suffice it to say that the new president learned quickly that the opening up of society 
while trying to also institute administrative, economic, and monetary reform would be 
counterproductive for the regime. Aside from allowing for strongly-controlled 
pluralization in the form of independent, non-Ba’ath parties that did not present any real 
contestation to the regime, little has been promised or achieved in the realm of political 
change. Political organization, and with it, civil society remains low. This is, however, a 
divergence from the Ba’ath party under Hafiz al-Assad’s rule wherein any opposition to 
the regime was considered an enemy of the state. This new authoritarian pluralism 
severely restricted actual participation in elections. 
For Bashar, significant economic growth could never be achieved without 
administrative reform in the country. As promised in his inaugural speech, Bashar and the 
new members of the regime set to fixing the over-centralization of the state, which 
proved to be a turning point in within his regime’s own political structure. The “old 
guard,” or rather those older high-ranking members that remained in the regime 
appointed by Hafiz, would see the capacity of the Ba’athist regime reduced.84 Patronage 
would no longer be relatively as important as state institutions. What was set in motion 
by administrative reform in Syria was a process wherein the younger members appointed 
by Bashar al-Assad would be able to exploit economic liberalization through dismantling 
the networks set up to benefit those members of the old guard that were most loyal to the 
Ba’athist regime.85 Or, as Donati argues, “Hafiz al- Assad’s generation got rich through 
the state sector, while Bashar al-Asad’s network of supporters monopolized the private 
sector and prospered.”86 While a complete dismantling of state-based cronyism was not 
implicitly promised by Bashar, the shift from state-based to market-based modes of rent-
seeking was on the new president’s agenda from the outset. 
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D. ECONOMIC REFORMS UNDER BASHAR AL-ASSAD 
Bashar al-Assad and his new cohorts saw economic governance as the key to 
reinforcing the sustainability of Ba’athist authoritarian rule. The regime branded this shift 
in economic governance and the reforms associated with it as the “social market 
economy” in an attempt to capture what was meant by the President Assad’s calls for 
“modernization.”87 The goal of the “social market economy” was to retain a commitment 
to the Ba’athist ideas of state-social relations and the institutions that facilitated these 
while finding ways to make the public sector as a whole function under market-oriented 
policies and regulatory networks. The goal of improving Syria’s economic performance 
was a tall order, but the aforementioned rhetoric played well with international financial 
institutions, and Syria desperately needed foreign direct investment (hereafter, FDI.) 
Syria, in the early years of Bashar al-Assad’s presidency, should not be 
considered a poor country but rather a middle-income, developing country that had 
misallocated its resources. Significant population growth in the 1980s and 1990s made 
the stagnant economy even more dire. When Bashar came to power, the percentage of the 
Syrian population below the age of 20 was around 52%, which put significant strain on 
the labor market.88 Without significant economic growth, Syria would not be able to deal 
with this youth bulge and crippling unemployment. Time was of the essence, and the 
Assad regime began the process of structural adjustment and reform to achieve growth 
through transition to greater market orientation and openness.  
1. Structural Adjustment 
Shortly after taking office, Bashar al-Assad and his team of technocrats set to 
work crafting and implementing a series of reforms aimed at transitioning toward a 
market-economy. A series of laws were passed that were aimed at opening up the Syrian 
economy, first and foremost, to the global market. This was in keeping with the dominant 
neoliberal model for economic growth at the time—the Washington Consensus—which 
promotes short-term economic stabilization and growth by curbing government spending 
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and subsidies, encouraging exports through currency devaluation, and raising interest 
rates and prices. Under this neoliberal model, long-term growth is achieved through 
adherence to structural adjustment plans (SAPs) that liberalize investment and trade, and 
privatize previously state-held resources and enterprises.89 The Syrian economic crisis 
that Bashar al-Assad inherited was believed by the IMF and the World Bank to have been 
mostly attributed to the heavy intervention of the government in the state’s economy. 
Policies that privileged exports and private investment were encouraged as the Syrian 
regime opened up the economy to private capital, both foreign and domestic.  
It can be generally stated that the Assad regime, more so out of domestic political 
necessity than acquiescence, adopted a gradualist approach to economic reform. As 
Volker Perthes and other scholars have noted, there were really four major economic 
challenges that needed to be addressed through Assad’s modernization policy. The first, 
as mentioned before, was a need for job creation to address the growing youth bulge. The 
second was a dependence on oil revenues. Though Syria had become an oil exporter in 
the mid-1980s, the some 60–70% of the country’s exports and around 12% of its GDP at 
the time depended on oil rent.90 Syria had relied on oil revenues to fund development 
projects and had not been actively seeking ways to counterbalance this as oil prices have 
declined and the country’s resources depleted. The third major challenge was to 
overcome statism and encourage private capital. This transition from public sector 
domination over all of the state’s essential industries was daunting as the public sector at 
the time employed around 75% of the workforce.91 The fourth challenge facing the state 
that was all too often overlooked was the need to maintain social stability. The effects of 
these modernizing economic reforms at the micro level as they relate to social stability 
will be examined in greater detail in the following chapter. To address the first three 
challenges—job creation, diversification of revenues, encourage private investment— 
Bashar al-Assad and the like-minded modernizers in his regime chose to focus their 
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attention on developing three main sectors of the economy: finance, trade, and 
agriculture.   
2. Financial Sector Reforms 
The main goal of al-Assad’s social market economy was economic growth, and 
the regime hoped to achieve this growth through instituting economic policies that 
facilitate capital flow and employment opportunities. Bashar and his reformers sought to 
achieve this first through addressing issues in the financial sectors that dissuaded foreign 
investment in Syria. In 2001, the Assad regime promulgated a banking law (Decree 28) 
that permitted the establishment of private banks, and also opened banking up to private 
citizens and non-citizens.92 Syria had not allowed private banks since the 1963 coup that 
brought the Ba’ath regime together, which made the actual establishment of private banks 
more challenging. The licensing process and the creation of the institutional framework 
was harder than many in the regime expected, but banks were established and foreign 
capital was allowed to hold up to 49% of the stocks. While the regime did find it difficult 
to find Syrian nationals willing and/or able to invest the 51% of capital needed, the 
domestic investment would eventually come. By 2009, the Assad regime would enact 
further banking reforms in the private sector and would allow foreign ownership of 
private Syrian banks up to 60% of shares.93 While a significant increase in the share of 
private sector banking in Syria was seen, the types of private sector banking was limited 
to regional brokers and Arab investors. Overwhelmingly, the international banks chose to 
uphold the U.S. sanctions that were imposed on Syria during the time and did not invest.  
In conjunction with the approval of private banks, the Assad regime reorganized 
Syria’s central bank, and created the Credit and Monetary Council (CMC) in 2002 whose 
role was to craft and manage monetary policy. This signaled a significant shift away from 
the austerity measure that was imposed in the 1990s to reduce the deficit. Bashar al-
Assad and his modernizers chose to reinvest in public infrastructure projects (particularly 
targeting financial centers of trade) as well as education.  
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3. Manufacturing/Trade Sector Reforms 
In keeping with statist economic tradition, the central planning that occurred in 
the Syrian Arab Republic under the Ba’athists severely stunted the growth of domestic 
production capabilities as well as the competitiveness of the domestic market. There 
existed an anxiety among many in the Syrian business class or bourgeoisie 
(overwhelmingly Sunni) that eliminating trade barriers and liberalization could drive 
domestic businesses to bankruptcy.94 The Assad regime fought these protests and pushed 
for liberalization seeing this as the best path to drive competitiveness amongst Syrian 
business, therefore leading toward more efficient industries that had the ability to export.  
To drive trade liberalization the Assad regime eased the export tax excised on 
Syrians while also drastically cutting the customs duties on import restrictions for local 
manufacturing firms.95 Archaic laws that had previously made the possession of and 
trading in foreign currency punishable by law were revoked and the previously set limits 
on foreign currency transactions were also eased. While these measures were, all aimed 
to enhance Syria’s ability to participate in a meaningful way in the global economy, they 
also emphasized the need for the Syrian people to take a vested interest in their role in the 
success of the reforms. The totality of the economic reforms rolled out by the Assad 
regime were underpinned by rhetoric that allowed Syrians more economic choices, but 
this also necessitated they play a bigger role in the economy’s success. What this 
implicitly entailed was that the drive toward more economic freedom and consumerism 
amongst Syrians would be matched by a roll back in the social provisions and social 
welfare structures of the Syrian state. This included subsidies that previously existed on 
staple foods as well as gas and energy sources. This role back of social resources 
occurred at a rate that was much faster than the private sector growth that was intended to 
provide an increase in pay and other provisions that could match more costly standards of 
living. 
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During this period of economic reform, the Syrian oil sector became another 
casualty. While Syrian oil exportation levels did not come close to reaching anywhere 
near those of the Gulf States, the oil industry in Syria went from being an oil exporter to 
an oil importer during this time. Overwhelmingly, the oil sector deteriorated due to lack 
of investment in the manufacturing sector combined with falling production rates.96 After 
peaking around 1995, the production of Syrian crude oil slowed steadily with a decline in 
output levels from more mature fields.97 The Assad regime recognized the need for 
exploration of new fields and recovery work in the mature oil fields to stabilize output, 
which could only be achieved through foreign capital and technology. The Syrian regime 
opened bids in 2001 for oil and natural gas exploration rights, which signaled an 
acceptance of the need for change.98 The Assad regime, through the state-owned Syrian 
Petroleum Company (SPC), would launch other rounds of production sharing exploration 
licenses prior to the start of the civil war with moderate success early in the decade. 
Namely, a 25-year production agreement was signed in 2004 between the SPC and China 
National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) to develop oil fields in Northeastern Syria, and 
in 2005 another 25-year production was signed with Russia’s Soyuzneftegaz.99 
Overwhelmingly though foreign companies, particularly in the West, have shown a 
reluctance to invest in Syria in light of civil unrest. This, combined with an extension of 
EU sanctions that included a ban on oil imports from Syria in early 2011 in retaliation to 
the regime’s crackdown on opposition protests, has left the oil sector unable to meet its 
own domestic energy consumption needs, much less in a position to profit from crude oil 
and natural gas exports.    
4. Agricultural Sector Reforms 
The transition to the social market economy included a dismantling of the 
structure that had long supported the agricultural sector in Syria and the rural populations 
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that worked the sector. As part of an overall transition by the Assad regime away from 
the agricultural sector toward other non-agricultural sectors that were thought would 
generate more capital, the subsidies on agricultural inputs (e.g., seeds, fertilizers, oil) 
were removed. These adjustments were combined with a reduction in state support in the 
form of social welfare to rural communities and placed considerable strain on those 
Syrians that traditionally worked in the agricultural sector.100  
Implemented in 2004, Law 56 initiated changes in structure of land tenure in the 
hopes that through giving landowners the ability to terminate tenants’ contracts and expel 
peasants from land might foster investment within the agricultural sector.101 The 
provisions of the law were convoluted, allowed for rampant speculation of land, and 
forced thousands of peasants off their lands—one of the largest internal displacements in 
the Middle East in recent years, not including the impending Syrian Civil War.102 
Combined with the lack of government provision of subsidies on agricultural inputs was 
a new law, introduced in 2005, that forbade drilling of new wells due to groundwater 
depletion, but was not effectively enforced. An overuse of groundwater reserves 
occurred, leading to crop failure and a sharp rise in animal mortality that forced over 
300,000 rural Syrians from their land.103  The neglect of rural communities, mostly in the 
Northeastern provinces, combined with a decline in agriculture’s ability to contribute to 
the Syrian GDP. If matters could not get worse for the rural Syrians living in the 
Northeastern provinces, a major drought plagued the country from 2006–2009 leading 
many rural workers to migrate to major Syrian cities looking for work. As a result of both 
the drought and the groundwater depletion, the Assad regime did accelerate land 
reclamation and irrigation for the land owners that benefited from the recent land 
distribution programs, yet the work was slow and an overwhelming amount of the Syrian 
populace formerly or presently employed by the agricultural sector was still in protest 
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over the state farm distribution policies, and these areas are traditionally worked by 
minority groups within Syria loyal to the regime.  
While the private sector may have grown during this period (2000-2010) due to 
the both financial and trade sector reforms, this growth was not on pace to gainfully 
employ the re-distribution of rural workers that were now coming to the major cities 
looking for work.  
E. MACROECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF REFORM 
Per Article IV of the IMF’s articles of Agreement, the IMF is to hold bilateral 
discussions with members of the Syrian Arab Republic, and will annually produce a 
consultation that gives a detailed overview of a country’s overall economic health and 
vitality. The last consultation completed for Syria was in the Spring of 2010. What is 
interesting about the report is the overall strengthening of Syria’s economic performance 
detailed in the report’s outlook. The macroeconomic picture painted of the Syrian Arab 
Republic details that the agricultural sector is likely to continue to recover from the 
severe drought, and therefore overall growth is expected at about 5% for the coming year, 
with the fiscal deficit expected to narrow by one percentage point of GDP.104 The report 
praises moderation in both domestic and public consumption, with no further mention of 
the drought, population displacement within the country, or the still slow growth rate of 
employment in the industrial/ private sector. An emphasis on further subsidy reform is 
also prevalent throughout the report, specifically urging the state to continue to cut 
agricultural subsidies.  
Other IMF country reports since Bashar al-Assad came to power in 2000 are 
similar in tone throughout the decade, and championed three main elements of the Syrian 
economy: overall GDP growth, reduction in public sector spending/subsidies, and 
structural adjustments made to the financial sector. As shown in Figure 1.  
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Figure 1.  IMF Rendering of Syrian Sectoral and GDP Growth Rates105 
While the IMF painted a largely positive picture of the Syrian political economy, 
other reports, particularly from the World Bank showed a more clear-eyed picture of a 
state devolving in to civil turmoil. As shown in Figure 2, the Assad regime’s ability to 
govern was deteriorating. Similarly, to Fukuyama, the World Bank uses the term 
“governance” as a starting point to describe “a government’s ability to make and enforce 
rules, and to deliver services.”106 The definition focuses on the execution of policies 
rather than on the quality of the policies a regime is attempting to reform. In the case of 
Syria, the capacity of the government to formulate and then effectively implement 
economic reform was lacking. Passing legislation was not enough if the regime did not 
have the institutional capacity to deliver on the promise of change and economic growth. 
As shown below, another side to the governance piece for the regime was a perceived 
lessening of adherence to rules or procedural measures, which painted an accurate picture 
of a country transitioning from statism to a form of crony capitalism.  
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Figure 2.  Governance Measurement in Syria from 1996–2015.107  
The relative success of economic reforms lies in the ability of the system to take 
shocks. In the case of Syria, while the macroeconomic picture painted by the IMF and 
other championing neoliberal economic reform, the roll back of the state, particularly its 
ability to employ and provide safety nets for its citizens, was sending the country down 
the path of civil unrest. This made the actualization of economic reform projects nearly 
impossible to achieve, and discouraged the much-needed Western investment so that 
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III. SYRIAN MICROECONOMICS UNDER BASHAR AL-ASSAD  
A. SYRIAN STATE AFTER LIBERALIZATION 
Implementing economic liberalization policies in Syria did not produce the 
expected growth results as evidenced by the civil war raging currently through the 
country. While the state is committed to major economic reform, there must be 
appropriate social safety nets in in place to compensate and protect citizens that are 
adversely affected by the expected or unexpected shifts in the economy until the 
economic opportunities exist to reinvest this human capital. A majority of the Arab 
countries that enacted neoliberal economic reforms in the 1990s did so by cutting 
government spending, particularly to social services, which has caused a great deal of 
societal unrest, and are de-stabilizing to these states. Syria, though a relative late-comer 
to economic reform, followed this same, prescriptive neoliberal economic reforms under 
Bashar al-Assad wherein cutting to government spending was a primary focus as shown 
in the previous chapter. These cuts to government spending, and, in particular, social 
services, would prove dire in the Syrian Arab Republic under Bashar because of the 
additional strain placed on his regime and the Syrian people at large due to drought that 
followed these reforms. This drought put Syria in extremis and state response was 
needed; however, the Syrian state was both unwilling and unable to respond because of 
the economic liberalization policies enacted by the regime.  
As will be shown in this chapter, the statewide emergency caused by the drought 
showed the Syrian people that the Assad regime was unable to handle the crisis. Three 
key destabilizing factors shaped the lack of state response to this crisis. First, neoliberal 
economic reforms removed social safety nets. These reforms cut social services which 
ignited tensions particularly in overcrowded Syrian cities that were already stretched thin 
by the influx of Iraqi refugees after the U.S. invasion in 2003 and the migration of rural 
workers affected by economic reforms and drought. Second, the Syrian agricultural 
sector that employed the significant portion of the Syrians, rivaled only by public sector 
employment, saw a drastic change under structural adjustment policies. And, finally, 
liberalization allowed for crony capitalism to emerge that caused a discordance in the 
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economic power structure through changing the key beneficiaries in the economy from 
the old Ba’athist guard to new business, crony-capitalists led by the Alawite elites. This 
shift in the elite identity within a short time period led to lack of accountability in the 
state; with the result that the state was unable to respond to the pending crisis.  
B. DROUGHT 
The match that eventually set fire to the various disparities of economic reform 
was lit in the northern and eastern Syrian provinces in 2006 when a severe drought 
engulfed the greater Fertile Crescent.108 The areas affected most severely by the drought 
included Al-Hasakah, Al-Raqqah, and Dier ez-Zor governorates, as shown in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3.  Syrian Rainfall Comparison against Normal Percentages109 
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For Syria, already suffering due to poor governance, unsustainable agricultural 
policies, and virtually non-existent environmental legislation, the drought served as a 
catalyst of destabilization. While some have argued that climate change caused the Arab 
Spring, this thesis does not espouse that correlation equals causation. In addition, while 
climate change may be a cause of the drought, the lack of state response needs to be 
explained as well. Rather, that climate change—in this instance in the form of a severe 
drought—served as a “threat multiplier” by compounding stress in the country from 
economic liberalization.110 These environmental conditions proved devastating for wheat 
production, which accounted for 83% of the country’s grain production.111 As illustrated 
in the Figure 4, over 75% of the country’s wheat production occurs in the northeastern 
“breadbasket,” which was an area in the country most affected by the drought. 
 
Figure 4.  Distribution of Agricultural Land vs. Wheat Producing Land in Syria 112 
Rainfall deficiency during the drought affected more than just the sustainability of 
wheat crops. During the drought, rainfall in eastern Syria had declined to 30% of the 
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annual average by 2008, and al-Khabour, a main tributary of the River Euphrates, dried 
up completely.113  As shown in Figure 5, the overall moisture deficiency in Northeastern 
Syria extremely reduced vegetation, which had serious ramifications for the feed grain 
and domestic food market. This overall decline in vegetation incited the need for imports 
of not just domestic food stuff, but also grain for livestock. 
  
Figure 5.  Decline in Vegetation Index in Syria from 2007–2008114 
Figures 3–5, from the USDA’s Foreign Agricultural Service in 2008, accurately 
depicted and predicted the devastation the drought had on Syria, and the need for outside 
aid. With a rapidly increasing population, the Syrian government was unable to meet 
domestic consumption needs, which was compounded by the already high demand for 
water and other crucial natural resources.115 
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During its course from 2006–2011, the drought caused nearly 75% of agricultural 
households to suffer total crop loss, and the depleted vegetation in the area would further 
compel many rural families to sell livestock well below cost after feed reserves were 
exhausted.116 Syria’s estimated livestock today is somewhere around 14 million, whereas 
before the drought the numbers stood around 21 million, reflecting millions that perished 
as a result of the drought.  
C. EFFECTS TO AGRICULTURAL SECTOR THROUGH SA 
The human and economic cost of the drought on the agricultural sector in Syria 
cannot be overstated. A United Nations report released in 2011 stated that “more than 
800,000 Syrians lost their entire livelihood as a result of the drought.”117 As described in 
the previous chapter, economic liberalization policies affected the agricultural sector to a 
disproportionately more than the other sectors of the economy since Bashar al-Assad 
came to power; these reforms, combined with the drought, devastated Syrian agricultural 
communities. Until the drought, the agricultural sector employed around 40% of Syria’s 
workforce and accounted for 25% of the country’s gross domestic product.118 Water 
mismanagement, lack of bureaucracy in rural areas, and the removal of essential 
subsidies were among the policies instituted by the Assad regime that directly affected 
the vitality of the agricultural sector. The drought, as will be shown below, highlighted 
the underlying destabilization caused by these neoliberal economic policies.  
Water mismanagement and poor governance plagued Syria well before Bashar al-
Assad came to power. Decades of criminal mismanagement and disregard for oversight 
of the country’s natural resources significantly contributed to both water shortages and 
desertification of agricultural lands.119 For decades the Ba’athist government encouraged 
inefficient irrigation techniques and heavily subsidized both water-intensive wheat and 
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cotton farming, all of which served to further deplete already-scarce water resources.120 
Similarly, to other countries in the Middle East, water policy is an afterthought, and the 
real driver of policy is a supply-side approach to the issue wherein the drive to expand 
irrigated agricultural area was to increase output in the sector.121 The natural limits of the 
resources in Syria are not the primary driver of policy, and a lack of long-term strategies 
have specifically devastated the Northeastern parts of the country.  To combat the 
dwindling water resources and meet the unrealistic agricultural targets from the state, 
farmers have turned to the country’s groundwater, and Syria’s own National Agricultural 
Policy Center reported an increase in the number of groundwater wells from around 
135,000 in 1999 to more than 213,000 in 2007.122 This dependence on groundwater not 
only further depleted water levels throughout the rural area to dangerously low levels, it 
also raised concerns about the water quality. 
Upon coming to power in 2000, Bashar al-Assad encouraged reform in the 
agricultural sector to address deficiencies. Bashar’s rhetoric, which aimed to increase 
efficiency through modernizing irrigation techniques and agricultural technology, also 
included the abolishment of subsidies to the sector. This process of modernization in 
agricultural sector as Syria transitioned to an open market economy was going to prove 
difficult at the outset because many of the farmers were not able to afford to invest in 
modern tools and the irrigation infrastructure. A job that the state had failed to do for 
decades. Inefficient irrigation systems remained in place as loans were scarce for the 
farmers, and the regime chose to combine a push to reform the sector at the same time 
that it chose to roll state subsidies back.123 Of the subsidies the Assad regime rolled back 
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to the agricultural sector, the one that affected irrigation availability the most was the 
removal of heavily subsidized diesel, which is used for pumping water and transporting 
crops to market. Official reports from 2008 (in the middle of the drought) noted that the 
Syrian government raised the domestic rate of diesel for agricultural purposes by a factor 
of 300–500%, from 7.0 Syrian pounds per liter to 25–35 Syrian pounds per liter.124 These 
subsidies roll backs to both diesel fuel and fertilizer, instituted under the premise of 
finding ways to reduce government debt, are in keeping with an official narrative held by 
the Assad regime which portrays Syria as a water-stressed state due mainly to external 
factors that are mostly beyond government control.125 The regime announced its 
commitment to “modernization” in the sector which creates a façade for the people that 
the regime will make appropriate investment in water resource management. This official 
regime narrative is not a reality for Syrians dependent on the sector, a reality that was 
often misrepresented or flat out ignored by those working in the Syrian water sector.126 
While Bashar called for reform in the agricultural sector as a whole, the overhaul of the 
government’s water sector—plagued by a bureaucracy characterized as uneducated and 
ill-equipped to handle water management frameworks—was not undertaken. The burden 
for the transition toward modernization appeared to rest with those working in the sector 
rather than those managing it.  
In conjunction with cuts to subsidies, the Assad regime enacted two other key 
areas of economic reform that were aimed toward modernizing the agricultural sector 
prior to the drought: the 2004 new Agrarian Relations Law, and the 2005 Water Law. 
Regarding the former, the Agrarian Relations Law was enacted as a way to foster 
investment in the agricultural sector after the privatization of all of Syrian state lands. To 
achieve such investments the Assad regime enacted the new agrarian relations law, 
hereafter Law 56, which enumerated more latitude to landowners, which included the 
right to terminate tenants’ contracts and expel peasants from the land they had been 
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working.127 While the objective of Law 56 was to achieve a more efficient agricultural 
sector for the wealth of the nation, what actually occurred was an increase in the 
speculation of land as wealthy landowners forced rural populations off land so they could 
then turn around and sell it. An increased exodus from the rural areas to cities ensued 
with cities ill-equipped to deal with the population influx. Employment in the agricultural 
sector dropped significantly after the implementation of Law 56, without a significant 
creation of jobs in other sectors. Law 56 led to much contestation among the 
disenfranchised rural populations in the northeastern governorates of the country for its 
preferential treatment toward capitalist, landowners at the expense of the regime’s usually 
loyal, rural support base.  
Mere months after Law 56 was implemented, the 2005 Water Law was enacted in 
a new wave of liberalization legislation this time intended to tackle irrigation issues in the 
country. The 2005 Water Law outlined various measures intended to improve the 
protection of water resources, which included the licensing of wells and regulating 
drilling procedures.128 Violation of such laws was supposed to be punishable with fine 
and prison sentences, but this had little effect. While the Water Law required all wells to 
be licensed, and for the licenses to renewed annually to monitor groundwater levels, the 
managerial capacity and legal framework to enact this was never implemented. Rather, 
widespread corruption ensued as the local government officials and security personnel 
working in these rural areas forced farmers to pay bribes for new licenses.129 Hate and 
discontent fomented in rural communities and the aim of groundwater regulation was not 
achieved.  
With no assistance from the Assad regime, the United Nations reported that rural 
families resorted to more “harmful coping strategies such as reducing their food intake, 
selling essential assets, and migration” from the agricultural lands of the northeast 
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affected by the drought.130  While organizations such as the World Food Program (WFP) 
began distributing food rations to 190,000 people in the eastern provinces of Hasakah, 
Deir ez-Zor, and Raqqa, at least another 110,000 people in the Jezira alone also required 
emergency food aid, which was not being met. 131  The pattern of poor rainfall continued 
in parts of the Jezira—particularly in the northeastern governorates of Deir ez-Zor, 
Hassakeh, and Raqqa—well into in the 2008/209 season, even though the rainfall in other 
parts of the country had recovered by this point.132 For those who had not already fled the 
battered northeast of the country, this lack of rainfall forced southward migration, 
particularly to the governate of Da’ra which also had an agricultural sector, but also to the 
outskirts of the major Syrian cities of Aleppo and Damascus. By 2008, officials from the 
Assad regime finally acknowledged that the drought had raised food prices to the point 
where the pressure on providing basic food supplies to the population was untenable.133 
Syria, by this point, had become a wheat importer for the first time in well over a decade 
and the humanitarian crisis in the northeastern provinces could no longer be ignored. To 
this end, the Assad regime, in conjunction with UN agencies, launched two drought 
appeals—first in September 2008 and again in August of 2009—for help in financing 
short-, medium-, and long-term aid as well as other development projects for the 
governorates of Homs, Raqqa, Hassakeh, and Deir al-Zor.134 Both the 2008 and the 2009 
Syrian Drought Appeals were underfunded, receiving just 20% and 33% of funds 
requested, respectively.135 The Appeal also did not allocate any funding to the 
governorates in the south such as Da’ra and the outskirts of Damascus, where the rural 
population had migrated.   
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Syrian cities, mainly the larger cities of Damascus, Aleppo, and Homs, had been 
coping with massive influxes of Iraqi refugees since the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. 
Neither the Syrian government nor the UNHCR opened camps to accommodate Iraqi 
refugees; thus the bulk of the refugees settled in the suburbs of major cities, primarily 
Damascus.136 The already stressed and disenfranchised population that was driven from 
Syria’s agricultural sector now had to compete with Iraqi refugees for jobs and scarce 
resources in the cities. The large-scale deterioration of water availability per capita was a 
main source of contention in urban areas already suffering from lack of government 
investment in infrastructure.  
Like most developing countries, Syria promoted temporary reception policies 
toward Iraqi refugees and kept them in a temporary status as a “guest based on touristic 
visa regulations” while still allowing them free settlement in major cities in the 
country.137 Damascus, a city of just over 4 million, experienced an influx of around two-
thirds of the hundreds of thousands of Iraqi refugees who fled after the 2003 invasion.138  
A majority of the Iraqi refugees living in the neighborhoods surrounding Damascus were 
urban, better educated than the local population, and well-equipped to work despite the 
precarious nature of their legal and economic situations. The arrival of the Iraqi refugees 
drove up rent prices in the city, and many of the rural Syrian migrants who came could 
not afford to compete in some of the refugee housing networks.   
D. SA BENEFITS FOR MANUFACTURING SECTOR AND BUSINESS 
NETWORKS 
Though Syria’s manufacturing sector and business networks improved their 
financial position overall during Bashar al-Assad’s first decade in power, clashes between 
the Ba’ath Party’s Old Guard and the Assad Regime’s new crony capitalists were a 
source of destabilization. As discussed in the previous chapter, the statist economic 
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model under Hafez al-Assad allowed the regime to maintain heavy control over the 
economy at large, and specifically over the labor market. This allowed for the 
development of extensive networks of patronage for the Ba’ath Party leadership. The 
institution of liberalization policies under Bashar overwhelmingly diminished the Ba’ath 
Party’s role in the economic structure, which was a very unwelcome change for many 
within the Ba’ath Party’s Old Guard who, under Hafez al-Assad, exploited their 
privileged position in the regime, namely in the manufacturing and business sectors. As 
crony capitalism emerged with the transition to a market economy, the new business elite 
showed no interest in sectors of the economy in which they were not engaged. The 
agricultural sector suffered as a result.  
E. CHANGE IN ELITE POWER STRUCTURE 
The shift in the balance of power after Bashar al-Assad came to power proved that 
the schism between political elites and beneficiaries of economic liberalization also 
encouraged deep societal changes that led to instability.139 At a macro level, the 
economic growth Syria experienced under Bashar disproportionately benefited those who 
were not already classified as poor. As shown in the figure below, and discussed more in 
depth in the previous chapter, Syria’s GDP in the 2000s showed remarkable annual 
growth rates between 4.5% and 7% from 2004-2009, and only slowed to 3.2% in 
2010.140  
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Figure 6.  Syria’s GDP Growth Rates during the Drought (2006–2011)141 
This unprecedented level of economic growth allowed Syria’s rich businessmen 
to get much richer, while the country’s poor continued to backslide. This influx of wealth 
and infrastructure investment was also only felt in particular areas in the state, namely in 
the areas where the Alawiites were a large constituency.142 Not only was economic 
growth disproportionate in Syria, the location of those Syrians classified as living in 
poverty was also not evenly spread throughout the state—most living at and below the 
poverty were concentrated in the rural north and east in the county143. The widening gap 
between the rich and the poor was a source of instability, particularly as many of the rural 
poor migrated to the cities during the drought and could now see first-hand the wealth 
and opulence that economic change brought to a privileged few.  
F. SUNNI BUSINESSMEN AND REGIME MAINTENANCE 
Hafez al-Assad was a shrewd politician and, while lambasted by many as nothing 
more than an authoritarian dictator, he possessed a keen understanding of coalition 
management. During his tumultuous rise to power and after solidifying his presidency, he 
carefully managed the power structure of the Syrian state and the Ba’ath regime, paying 
particular attention to the Sunni leaders he placed in power. He understood that for a 
                                                 
141 “Syria GDP Annual Growth Rate,” Trading Economics. 
142 Khafaji, “De-Urbanizing the Syrian Revolt,” 5. 
143 Ibid, 3. 
 55 
majority Sunni country to be ruled by an Alawiite, strong coalitions must be formed with 
powerful Sunni leaders that were faithful Ba’ath party members. Those Sunnis who rose 
to the high levels within the Ba’ath Party under the Assad regime came primarily from 
the urban notable classes, which also had consolidated a fair amount of administrative 
power under the Ottoman Empire.144 These men were also fairly involved in the state-led 
business sector in the country, and saw the Ba’ath Party as a way to protect this position 
of power.  
Enter Bashar al-Assad in 2000, whose talks of transitioning to a market economy 
and liberalization policies became a threat to the traditional power structure of the Sunni 
business leaders and politicians. While Bashar’s ascension to power may have seemed to 
be a smooth transition to those on the outside looking in, his role as president did not 
carry with it the same commanding authority enjoyed by his father over all of the party 
faithful.  While the Old Guard and the crony capitalists were locked in a stalemate, 
sectarian and class divisions in Syrian society were amplified by the regime’s inability to 
respond and meet basic social services for the Syrian people, which was, in part, due to 
political infighting over the implementation over neoliberal economic reforms.  
To show the extent of the institutional deadlock that prevented the Ba’athist 
regime from responding  to the drought’s impact on the Northeastern parts of the country, 
Syria’s former Minister of the Economy, Abdulla al-Dadari, revealed in interviews that 
the regime was in an “administrative stalemate between competing interests within the 
state bureaucracy [which] prevented aid from reaching the population.”145 Dardari further 
explained that the stalemate rested with the Ba’ath Party Old Guard who did not want to 
see aid distributed outside of the traditional channels, which undercut the party’s power 
in the local governorates. Bashar’s crony capitalist regime and the Ba’ath Party’s network 
used to extract state resources were on a collision course over economic reforms. In 2011, 
Dardari and his entire cabinet were ultimately dismissed. Dardari’s commitment to 
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market-oriented policies was, in many ways, as equally damning for the Syrian people as 
the vast network of Ba’athists extracting rents from state resources. The shift to a market 
economy did not activate the stagnating rural economy as neoliberal economic policy 
predicted. Rather the transition toward the market economy cut key subsidies that 
negatively multiplied the effects of the drought.146  
Aside from the crippling institutional stalemate within the regime, corruption and 
lack of accountability remained a power disincentive for both local and foreign 
investors.147 For Bashar and his new guard in the regime, the gradualist approach that 
they were forced to take with economic reforms did little to assuage the fears of foreign 
investors that a return could be made on their capital. Part of this fear stemmed from the 
slow pace of legislation to match the transition to the market economy. So, while private 
banks were given licenses to operate in Syria, the country’s banking laws and judicial 
system did not inspire confidence that corruption and mismanagement of funds would 
actually be prosecuted. Not helping the president’s case for further liberalization was the 
president’s cousin, Rami Makhlouf, who had (like many other prominent Alawiites) 
become a business mogul in the country. Makhlouf owns SyriaTel (one of only two 
phone service providers in the country) and has used this position to monopolize other 
business ventures in the country.148 So while there are some in the regime that 
championed this case and show Makhlouf as the poster child for a successful transition to 
the market economy, there are outside actors who saw this monopoly acquisition as 
dangerous to growth, and make the case that another firm in competition with Makhlouf’s 
for a corner of the market would undoubtedly not be protected. For the Old Guard, they 
see the case of SyriaTel as a lost opportunity wherein they would traditionally receive 
rent had this corner of the market remained under state control.  
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G. DA’RA SPARK 
Observers of the Arab Spring watched it unfold, and many thought Syria immune 
to this wave of protest for change and regime change. After all, the regime saw 
unprecedented economic growth and many outside observers thought this would solidify 
Bashar al-Assad’s rule. The Syrian Arab Republic was different than Egypt and Tunisia, 
with dissimilar grievances. Not only did the Syrian uprising occur later, they occurred in 
a different fashion. While Tunis and Cairo rose up first and led the revolution, Damascus 
and Aleppo did not readily join the protests against Bashar al-Assad, and most certainly 
did not lead the opposition movement. Rather, the provincial town of Dar’a in Syria’s 
southeast was the epicenter of the uprisings against the Ba’athist regime. Dar’a province 
has retained its agricultural importance since the Ottoman Empire, and Dar’a city is 
widely regarded as one of the most important gateways between the Levant and the state 
of the Arabian Gulf. Dar’a City’s position as a major transit point for southbound traffic 
and also the smuggling of goods between Turkey, Jordan, Syria, and Saudi Arabia lends 
to the governorate’s importance. The area also held a strategically frontline position in 
the Arab-Israeli conflict as it borders both Jordan, and the Golan Heights. While the 
province is predominantly Sunni Arab, there are smaller populations of minorities which 
include Christian, Shia, and Druze, though tribal affiliations dominate fealty in the 
region.149  To many observers, this region seemed to be an outlier for protest. Dar’a had a 
reputation as largely being loyal to the Ba’athist regime, and the agricultural province 
benefited from land reforms.150  Its loyalty to the Ba’athist regime was rewarded under 
Hafiz al-Assad, and many of the high-ranking positions in the regime that were held by 
Sunnis, were disproportionately held by Dar’awis up until the 1990s. The rural farming 
town of Dar’a, which once held a privileged position under the Ba’athist regime, became 
a focal point for protests and was therefore a surprise. Under the neoliberal economic 
reforms instituted by Bashar al-Assad and the onset of the drought, the governorate now 
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received very little assistance from the regime for their loyalty.151 However, their 
autonomy, the prize for decades of loyalty for the Ba’athist regime, provided the 
“opportunity” and “threat” (key elements in social mobilization studies) that prompted 
mass mobilization in the Spring of 2011.152  
In March 2011, the population of Dar’a initially took to the streets in protest of 
the arrest of 15 school-aged children who painted anti-regime graffiti on the walls of their 
school; however, the demonstrations soon morphed into a larger contestation of 
government corruption, notably, government purview over groundwater use and well-
licensing.153 This collective action, some argue, was due as much in response to 
perceived regime repression as it was to Dar’a’s ability to capitalize on their dense social 
networks.154  By the time the school boys were released a few weeks later with obvious 
signs of torture on their bodies, the demonstrations in the city had already reached levels 
the regime was not equipped to handle. The Assad regime had systematically pulled back 
security forces from Dar’a and other loyalist areas in the south fearing the potential 
uprising in other parts of the country where the opposition was stronger such as 
Damascus, Homs, Hama, or predominately Kurdish areas. Such areas were more likely to 
be inspired by events in Tunisia and Egypt.155 By the end of April, the Assad regime had 
to send snipers, tanks, and regular army units to Dar’a to execute a siege of the city, and 
repress nearby towns and villages that stood with Dar’awis in solidarity. The siege lasted 
several weeks before security forces started to pull back from the city, though protests 
were not completely curtailed, armed clashes with security forces continued for months. 
Dar’a eventually became one of the epicenters of the Free Syrian Army, and remains 
outside of control of the Assad regime.156  
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The collective action and mobilization that took place in Dar’a in the Spring of 
2011 was the culmination of a decade of perceived decline in both power and economic 
position in the regime combined with the development of autonomous business networks 
for those operating in the governorate. Amidst a decline in favored positions in the 
Ba’athist regime and economic opportunity, the clan networks provided much needed 
opportunities for careers and status in business, administration, and cultural positions. 
This Dar’a family clan structure—made up of seven major “houses”—significantly 
impacts daily life in the region where the Assad regime does not.157 The tens of 
thousands of rural migrants that came down from the battered northeastern provinces of 
the country were soon indoctrinated in to these dense social networks. These social 
networks developed around circular labor migration, which was the region’s major source 
of income.158 Both menial and skilled labor were involved in this circular migration, and 
the Dar’a region is one of the highest in Syria for dependence on remittances as a portion 
of household incomes. The Syrian Central Bureau of Statistics estimated in 2007 that 
Syrian migrant workers brought in more than $800 million in remittances, whereas many 
of these transactions are handled in cash payments, and are normally not recorded.159  
The world of circular labor migration is based on trust in the dense social 
networks of Dar’a. The individuals involved in labor migration must be able to exist in 
both illegal and semi legal conditions in Jordan and Lebanon, respectively. These illegal 
activities generated networks in which certain skills, tactics, and resources (i.e. human 
smuggling, and arms trafficking) were developed autonomously from the state.160 These 
networks also provided the social space needed for mobilization and protest- something 
sorely lacking in other parts of the Syrian state. Dar’awis, though traditional in their 
adherence to clan values, were overwhelmingly cosmopolitan in their politics. Grievances 
and nonconformist views on Ba’ath party leadership could be addressed within these 
social networks and also while the workers lived abroad and had access to other forms of 
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media. Dar’a social networks allowed for the circulation and interpretation of information 
released about the Arab Uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt. The Arab uprisings in Tunisia 
and Egypt served as models for Dar’awis who perceived the Ba’athist regime as corrupt, 
but also saw that it was no longer providing for the best interests of the Syrian people—
even those such as the Dar’awis, who had traditionally been so loyal to the regime.  
Dar’a and the surrounding areas did not see the same level of deprivation as was 
experienced in the northeast of the country which was ravaged by drought and forgotten 
by the state. Rather, Dar’a experienced a withdrawal of state administration from their 
areas and a lack of state investment in the governorate while the country transitioned to a 
market economy. Investment in local infrastructure came from those in Dar’a that had 
benefited from the social networks that existed around labor migration; however, these 
tribal leaders no longer experienced upward mobility in the Assad regime that they once 
enjoyed.  The new beneficiaries were … and they became a new competing elite. These 
factors, combined with the formation of network opportunities for opposition, made the 
crackdown of the security apparatus in Dar’a all the more untenable, and the Dar’awis 
rose in protest as the Ba’ath Party showed that it was unable to accommodate new 
business associations that provided dissatisfied population with a space and opportunity 
to aggregate. 
H. FIRST LIBERALIZATION, NOW DEMOCRATIZATION? 
While the implementation of economic liberalization policies only benefited a 
small portion of the business class, the Assad regime was able to co-opt the 
disenfranchised working classes. This appeasement was accomplished by overtly 
promising job security in the manufacturing and business sector, and covertly attacking 
the worker and peasant unions in the country which they viewed as obstacles on the path 
toward modernization.161  As the Assad regime pushed the open market economy, no 
massive strikes or sit-ins by employees in the state sector were documented.  Further, 
even as the country devolved in to conflict, the institutionalized working classes in the 
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major manufacturing/ business areas in Aleppo and Damascus harbored ambivalent 
attitudes toward the armed opposition, with other members of the same business sector 
continuing to pledge outright support for the Assad regime. According to official figures 
in Syria, 1.4 million people were on the government payroll in 2010—taxi drivers, 
teachers, civil servants, factory workers—which may partially explain why certain areas 
in Aleppo and Damascus, where a majority of these public-sector workers were 
employed, chose to stay neutral as the protests and armed conflict ensued.162 
While the state might have had the resources, given its new support groups and 
the declining support of the other elite, it was unable to respond properly to the changing 
economy and the drought. This lack of state support due to economic liberalization forced 
Syrians to turn to other alternatives rather than the Ba’athist regime to meet their basic 
security needs. This transition to the market economy under Bashar al-Assad was 
synonymous with a political transition in Syrian wherein the once all-powerful Ba’athist 
regime was no longer the dominating force in public life, which allowed for the Syrian 
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IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER NEOLIBERAL 
ECONOMIC REFORMS 
A. RESTATEMENT OF RESEARCH QUESTION 
The purpose of this thesis is to explain how the implementation of neoliberal 
economic reforms in Syria under President Bashar al-Assad destabilized the country from 
2000 leading to the violent protests in early 2011. This research question was answered 
through the course of the thesis by first analyzing the adoption of the statist economy 
under the Ba’athist regime, and then through detailing wide-range of economic reforms 
adopted by Bashar al-Assad to move Syria toward a more liberal market economy under 
the guidance of the IMF. This thesis examined how neoliberal economic reform was a net 
positive for Syria at a macroeconomic level but did not translate to positive economic 
growth across sectors of the Syrian economy. Certain sectors of the economy, namely the 
agricultural sector, experienced extreme hardship as a result of reform. The burden of 
economic liberalization was not balanced throughout different sectors of the economy, 
and had destabilizing effects at the microeconomic level.  
This thesis has sought to explain how these reforms destabilized Syria during 
Bashar al-Assad’s first decade in power through three main ways: 1. these reforms 
negatively affected the agricultural sector, which employed the majority of Syrians; 2. 
these reforms caused a discordance in the economic power structure through changing the 
key beneficiaries in the economy from the old Ba’athist guard to new business, crony-
capitalist, who were mainly Alawite; and 3. these reforms cut social services, which 
ignited tensions in the overcrowded cities that were already stretched thin by the influx of 
Iraqi refugees after the U.S. invasion in 2003, as well as rural migrants following the 
drought that started in 2006.  These three factors are juxtaposed with IMF and World 
Bank reports released since Bashar al-Assad came to power in 2000. Overwhelmingly, 
these reports champion the fiscal health of the Syrian economy by highlighting overall 
GDP growth, reduction in public sector spending, and structural adjustments made to the 
financial sector. 
 64 
The disparity between the macroeconomic picture of the Syrian economy and the 
microeconomic implication of transitioning to an open market economy was pronounced 
by the unwillingness and inability of the regime to respond to the drought in 2006. The 
influx and movement of people (mainly rural migrants) due to the Iraq war, drought, and 
agricultural reform created a demand for basic goods in certain areas of the country, 
which lead to a more destabilized Syrian political economy after market liberalization. 
The protests in Dar’a, as shown in the thesis, were an outgrowth of this economic 
disparity. In conclusion, the totality of the neoliberal economic reforms rolled out by the 
Assad regime entailed a rollback in the social provisions and social welfare structures of 
the Syrian state. This rollback occurred too rapidly for the private sector to respond. As a 
result, the private sector was unable to provide an increase in pay and other provisions 
that could match more costly standards of living.   
B. MEDIA CONTENT ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC REFORM 
As shown in this thesis, structural adjustment policies were problematic at the 
local level, though, interestingly, major media outlets did not reflect this economic 
reality. A quick content analysis survey conducted shows that the de-stabilization of the 
Syrian economy was not covered in mainstream, print news stories. The articles that did 
discuss the effects of economic reform were usually academic in nature, and framed the 
dire economic situation in such a way that the Assad regime subsumed all responsibility 
for these failings. The IMF and the neoliberal economic policies the Fund espoused were 
generally not mentioned in the articles. While the Assad regime implemented economic 
liberalization policies, these policies were not enacted in a vacuum without guidance 
from the IMF.   
The global community has watched the bloody conflict unfold through mainly the 
lens of social media, as traditional journalists seek to integrate social media reporting in 
to their own work and do not have access to ground-level reporting. The news, online or 
through traditional print, is inundated with reporting on the bloody Syrian conflict and it 
is hard to turn on any major news network and not see gruesome images of Aleppo under 
siege. This love affair between war and mass media is not a new one, and as such, has 
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been examined extensively. As casualty estimates from the Syrian conflict continue to 
rise, so has the media coverage. What this media does not cover is what conditions led to 
the conflict? What conditions were being reported? And, finally, is there a way to stop 
such a bloody conflict in the future?  
The main objective of this section on media content analysis is to examine if 
unrest was reported in Syria, and whether the conditions that led to conflict were related 
to the narrative. In particular, were economic reforms reported as a destabilizing 
condition that helped lead to the conflict in Syria? To understand how the adoption of 
new economic policies affected Syria and made the country unstable leading up to the 
start of armed conflict, Chapter III of this thesis examined the implementation of 
economic reforms under the guidance of the IMF. While these reforms were enacted, 
major media organizations did not link economic liberalization with destabilization, and 
largely Syria was underreported during this period, and certainly not as a country that 
was devolving into chaos.  
1. Lack of Media Coverage of Disparity 
Given that the goal of this research was to be primarily thematic and comparative 
of major print media, the initial results from the sample collected were discouraging to 
this end. The lack of print media available from BBC, CNN, and Al-Jazeera English that 
discussed the drought, the IMF, or economic reforms together in an article about Syria 
between 2006–2012 is discouraging, and did not provide a selection of stories that 
showed reasonable evidence for variations in coverage.  
Agenda setting plays a major role in the ability to conduct research in this field. 
What is not in the news is as important as what is in the news—in this case, the vast 
economic reforms taking place in Syria under Bashar al-Assad, the drought, and IMF 
work in the country did not reach the level of newsworthy for the likes of BBC, Al-
Jazeera English, and CNN. This trend fell in line with most major academic writing on 
Syria from 2006 to 2012 as well. Economic growth and globalization in the Middle East 
did not appear a hot topic as a majority of academics and journalists alike focused on 
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regional conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, which proved to be shortsighted. There were, 
however, two important outlying pieces.   
2. Background: Syrian Conflict in Mainstream Media 
In 2013, William R. Polk, acclaimed author and foreign policy consultant, wrote a 
piece for The Atlantic entitled “Understanding Syria from Pre-Civil War to Post-Assad” 
where he argues that there are two major components necessary to understanding the 
state of Syria on the eve of the conflict that led the country toward civil war. The first 
factor, he argues, stems from imbalance between the population and resources, which led 
to the shattering of the fragile “social contract” between the government and the Syrian 
people.163 The second factor Polk argues is tied to the manifestation of the Syrian State 
under Hafez al-Assad in which the regime failed “to bridge the gap between the demands 
of Islam and the new role of the Alawi community.”164 Both factors were destabilizing 
and show why particular political, economic, and social challenges were destabilizing to 
the point of devolution into bloody civil war. This was one of the first major journals to 
run an in-depth piece attempting to provide causation, and, at the very least, correlation 
for the Syrian conflict. The bloody conflict waged for well over a year by the time The 
Atlantic ran the piece.  
Early in 2014, another scholarly article was released that examined the 
aforementioned drought and the role it played as a trigger of the Syrian uprisings that 
started in March 2011. The article frames the devastating drought that struck northeastern 
Syria from 2006–2010 in the “context of rapid economic liberalization and long-standing 
resource mismanagement.”165 The article’s author, acclaimed journalist and editor 
Francesca de Chatel, further argued that focusing solely on external factors such as the 
drought as the driver toward the Syrian uprising is counterproductive because it diverts 
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attention from the fundamental political and economic grievances of the protestors.166 
Through her piece, Chatel also shows that it was not the drought that caused people to 
rise up, but rather “the government’s failure to adequately respond to this crisis.”167   
3. Conclusions from Media Content Analysis 
Content analysis was conducted by reviewing around 70 print media articles from 
2006 to the start of the armed conflict were reviewed. Content was analyzed to better 
understand the way in which the role of the IMF, economic reforms in Syria, and the 
drought were portrayed. Overwhelmingly, the IMF’s role in Syria, economic reforms, 
and the drought were not reported on by main stream media, The Atlantic piece and 
Chatel’s piece on “The Role of Drought and Climate Change in the Syrian Uprising,” as 
noted exceptions to this rule, though neither piece was published by mainstream media 
sources. One article in particular though (from the New York Times) connected all of the 
dots. On June 24, 2011, NYT Reporter Anthony Shadid, contributing from Damascus, 
argued that economic reform directly led to Syria’s instability in his piece entitled, 
“Syria’s Ailing Economy Poses a Threat to Assad.” Shadid eloquently argued that:  
For much of the world, Syria’s revolt has been viewed, through its 
politics, as a reaction to the ferocious crackdown deployed by one of the 
region’s most authoritarian governments.  But an economy long hailed for 
its potential—though its stewards have been criticized for its 
mismanagement—has played no less a role in the upheaval.168 
In summary, what an analysis of media content analysis shows is that the perils of 
economic liberalization, though very real in their ability to destabilize, went largely 
unreported by major media organizations until a boiling point was reached and there is 
armed conflict.  
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C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
As things evolved on the political front in the 1990s and in to the 21st century in 
the Arab World, rulers, more often than not, were turning to economic liberalization in 
the hopes of gaining favor and support from the IMF.169 The transition to economic 
liberalization in the Middle East is viewed by many scholars as particularly difficult 
because of the social effects of reform which are coupled with growing populations and 
the depletion of natural resources; however, the depth of these social and developmental 
challenges is surprisingly lacking from typical discourse on the Middle East in both a 
scholarly and journalistic-sense, as was shown in this thesis through the literature review 
and content analysis of major media organizations.170 To this end, a comparison of the 
economic liberalization policies implemented in the Middle East with that of other 
developing areas around the world, particularly Southeast Asia, would be beneficial for 
future research. A comparative analysis of the development and evolution of traditionally 
similar colonial economies under the French Mandate in Syria and Lebanon would also 
be an important study and provide key point of divergence that may be essential to 
studying developmental policy in the region.  
Another area of proposed future research seeks to understand models of social, 
economic, and political organization that support state-building rather than economic 
development may prove to be an alternative to the neoliberal model of economic 
development still rooted in the key tenets of the Washington Consensus, which long ago 
proved detrimental to developing countries.  
D. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS FOR FUTURE NEOLIBERAL ECONOMIC 
REFORM 
The unfettered belief in the absolute correctness of free markets as the driver 
toward growth and prosperity continues to blind those proponents of neoliberal 
economics from the instability caused at the local level during transition to market 
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economies. The IMF and other similar institutions can and should be prescribing more to 
the developing states during the critical period of transition. If all politics is local, then 
this same edict surely must apply to economics. It needs to further be recognized that 
there are areas in state economies where markets may not be relied upon and therefore 
the governing apparatus in the state has an important role to play in promoting economic 
stability as well as upholding social contracts with those whom it governs.171 In this vein, 
the IMF, World Bank, and similar organizations that champion neoliberal economic 
policies would be better served making investments in infrastructure related to 
institution-building so that the developing countries that are transitioning to market 
economies may still be able to govern effectively. The IMF should invest to encourage 
reform instead of requiring reform as a pre-requisite to investment and loans. The 
destabilization that occurs as states roll back crucial social services under the guise of 
balancing the state budget to be eligible for IMF loans may seem rational, but does not 
logically make the state more stable domestically, a key component to encourage 
investment. 
The purpose of this thesis is to show how neoliberal economic reforms were 
destabilizing in Syria, and to further suggest a recourse for future implementation of 
neoliberal economic reforms in other developing countries. As previously discussed, a 
recognition of the dangers that come with market liberalization by those in charge of the 
international financial system is needed. Furthermore, the guidance to governments 
instituting economic liberalization in developing countries must be centered on 
institution-building that allows these states to do the following in their political 
economies: 1. improve risk management; 2. improve banking regulations; 3. improve 
safety nets; and 4. improve response to crises. Focusing on these four areas of economic 
reform instead of a continued emphasis on balance of payments at the macro-level, will 
better prepare governments to take shocks.  
To the first point, an improvement in risk management places a burden on the 
developed countries, which are advocating neoliberal reform, to help the less developed 
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countries mitigate risks in interest fluctuations. While it is not a simple solution for a 
developing country to either peg their currency to the dollar or allowing it to free float the 
exchange rate, the developed countries and organizations like the IMF can help by 
absorbing some of the interest rate fluctuation risk as countries transition to a market 
economy. To the second point, improvement in banking regulations will not only allow 
for FDI, but also for stability in domestic markets. Weak banking regulations often lead 
to bad lending processes, which in turn hinders the private sectors’ ability to gain access 
to capital and begin to fill the economic role previously held by the state.  
To the third and fourth points, an improvement in social safety nets and the state’s 
ability to respond to disasters, are crucial in maintaining the vital social contract between 
the state and the people. Compensating and protecting citizens most adversely affected by 
the reforms is crucial in dissuading civil unrest. In the case of Syria, the state backed out 
of key areas where it normally provided social services in favor of reducing government 
expenditures. The IMF and other international actors in the financial sector need to 
reevaluate current rhetoric in favor of policies that help developing states build their 
social safety net capacities—not roll them back. This may mean international assistance 
is provided to the states that are earmarked for critically vulnerable sectors of the 
economy such as agriculture and small business. Investing in a developing country’s 
ability to provide social services may help deter disaster situations, or at least make them 
more bearable to the population. As was seen in the Syrian case, the rollback of subsidies 
and social services in the agricultural sector exacerbated the effects of the drought.  
While this thesis proposes changing the implementation of neoliberal economic 
policies from its current focus on opening markets and rolling back government 
expenditures in developing countries to a promotion of developing institutional structures 
in these countries during transition, a change in mindset must also occur. While 
neoliberal economic policies are seen as the natural progression on the path of 
globalization, the human cost of reform is very real, and much higher in developing 
countries. Gradual processes of reform should be preferred, and investment from the 
international community during the transition to market economies should be expected as 
the developing states on the path to liberalization will need the investment to curb 
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destabilization. As shown in the case of the Syrian Arab Republic, the implementation of 
a wide-range of economic reforms toward a more liberal market economy under the 
guidance of the IMF, ultimately contributed toward instability that led to civil war, all the 
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